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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During his last days in office in January of 2012, Mississippi Governor Haley 
Barbour granted executive clemency to 215 individuals, a number of whom had 
been convicted of violent crimes, including murder.  The public outcry to the 
pardons was quick and immediate.1  In response, the state attorney general brought 
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Of course, all errors and omissions are mine alone. 
1   See, e.g., CNN Wire Staff, Attorney General: Barbour Tried to Rule the State Like Boss 
Hogg, 12 NEWS, http://www.12newsnow.com/story/16506836/attorney-general-barbour-tried-to-rule-
the-state (last visited Sept. 29, 2015); Sarah Fowler, Barbour’s Pardons Spark National Outrage, 
COLUMBUS PACKET (Jan. 12, 2012), http://packet-media.com/2012/01/12/barbours-pardons-spark-
national-outrage/; Mississippi Judge Blocks Release of 21 Inmates Given Pardons by Gov. Barbour, 
FOX NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/01/11/mississippi-judge-blocks-
release-21-inmates-given-pardons-by-governor-barbour/ [hereinafter Mississippi Judge Blocks 
Release]; Rich Phillips, Mississippi Pardons Challenged at Court Hearing, CNN (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://cnn.com/2012/02/09/us/mississippi-governor-pardons; Appeals Court Upholds Haley Barbour 
Pardons, ROAD2JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2012), https://road2justice.wordpress.com/2012/03/10/appeals-
court-upholds-haley-barbour-pardons/; Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Governor, Already 
Criticized on Pardons, Rides a Wave of Them Out of Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, at A13; 
Randy Walker, Can Victims of Haley Barbour’s Pardoned Murderer Find Justice?, DAILY BEAST 
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an action challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s clemency orders.  The 
state attorney alleged that the governor’s actions were unlawful because he issued 
the pardons in derogation of the Mississippi Constitution’s thirty-day publication 
requirement, thereby leaving the public and, more pointedly, the victims, without 
notice or an opportunity for any type of hearings regarding the pardons.2  
However, upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the governor’s 
actions, declining to address whether he had acted inappropriately.3   
While the initial outcry against the Governor’s pardons was fevered, response 
to the state Supreme Court’s decision was relatively muted, with very little public 
or scholarly debate devoted to analyzing the state court’s decision.4  Nor has there 
been much discussion inquiring as to how the court’s decision impacted victims’ 
rights.5  There is certainly ample scholarship addressing how to ground and define 
the executive pardon power within our system of democratic government.6  
                                                                                                                                          
(Feb. 11, 2012),  http://www.thedailybeast. com/articles/2012/02/11/can-victims-of-haley-barbour-s-
pardoned-murderer-find-justice.html. 
2   See infra Part VI. 
3   In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012). 
4   See generally, Chad Flanders, Pardons and the Theory of the "Second-Best”, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 1559 (2013); Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 698 (2012) [hereinafter Kobil, Compelling Mercy]; Jackson C. Smith, Note, In re 
Hooker: A Political Question Doctrine Game Change, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 531 (2014); Katie R. Van 
Camp, Comment, The Pardoning Power: Where Does Tradition End and Legal Regulation Begin?, 
83 MISS. L.J. 1271, 1285–90 (2014).   
5   See, e.g., Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice: 
Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 437 (1999) (briefly discussing victim interests in pardon process); Austin 
Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the 
Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1313–37 (2004) (same). 
6   See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 153, 153–55 (2009); Beau Breslin & John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of 
Clemency, 81 OR. L. REV. 231, 233–34 (2002); P.E. Digeser, Justice, Forgiveness, Mercy and 
Forgetting: The Complex Meaning of Executive Pardoning, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 161, 162 (2003); John 
Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 POLITY 389, 392 
(2003); Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 415–17; Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (2012); William F. Ducker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A 
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 479 (1977); Flanders, supra note 4, at 1567–
70; Brian Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 572 (2001); 
Kobil, Compelling Mercy, supra note 4, at 699–702; Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in 
Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 219 (2003) [hereinafter Kobil, How to Grant Clemency]; 
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardon Power from the King, 69 TEX. 
L. REV. 569, 580 (1991) [hereinafter Kobil, The Quality of Mercy]; Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of 
Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 
125 (2001); Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the 
President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1484, 1500–06 (2000) [hereinafter Love, Of 
Pardons]; Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President 
Can Learn from the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 730, 735 (2012) [hereinafter Love, Reinvigorating 
the Federal Pardon Process]; Margaret Colgate Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of 
Pardoning, 32 LITIG. 25, 28–29 (2006) [hereinafter Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of 
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Similarly, there is an ever-growing body of scholarship addressing the increased 
integration of victim interests into the criminal justice process.7  However, there is 
a dearth of literature addressing the intersection of these two areas of law.  To date, 
no one has directly asked how our legal system can square victims’ rights to have 
notice and be heard on matters involving the crimes committed against them with 
the executive branch’s largely exclusive and discretionary right to pardon those 
convicted for crimes.  This article strives to make an initial foray into that chasm. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s In re Hooker decision highlights the many 
intractable questions that surround the executive branch’s power to pardon and 
how that power impacts crime victims.  At bottom, the decision suggests that in 
practice, a victim’s ability to be heard in the context of a pardon decision, much 
less assert any rights he or she may possess in that context, is very much limited by 
the grace and mercy of the government.  In response to this problem, I suggest that 
the social science theory of procedural justice can bring some cohesion to pardon 
practice, whereby the interests of defendants, victims, and broader society are 
appropriately taken into account.8  So doing, even though pardon practices remain 
predominantly discretionary and driven by notions of mercy and grace, procedural 
justice theory can help measure and temper that mercy, thereby allowing for the 
smoother intersection of pardon practice and victims’ rights. 
                                                                                                                                          
Pardoning]; Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1187–93 (2010) [hereinafter Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power]; Kathleen 
Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 282 (1993); 
Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1501, 1502, 1510–12 (2000); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The 
Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 43, 77–78 (1998); Sarat & Hussain, supra note 5, at 1311; Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: 
Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 
176–77 (2010); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the 
United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89–90 (2002) [hereinafter Strasser, The Limits of the 
Clemency Power]. 
7   See generally David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The Federal Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623 (2008); Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The 
Proposed Crime Victims' Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1997); Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially 
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135 (2007) [hereinafter Beloof, Weighing Crime 
Victims’ Interests]; Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 357 (1986); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861 (2007); Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The 
Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Opening the Door of 
the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 839 (1997); Jon Kyl, Steven J. 
Twist, & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, 
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
581 (2005); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen 
Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 21 (1999); Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good and 
Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 369 (1999) [hereinafter Twist, The Crime Victims’ Rights 
Amendment]. 
8   See infra Part V. 
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This article will use the In re Hooker decision as a point of departure to 
examine the conflict between the executive branch’s broad pardon power and 
crime victims’ rights to be heard and consulted in regard to a defendant’s 
punishment.  I will begin with a discussion of pardon practice, laying out its 
competing theoretical foundations as well as highlighting how that competition 
embodies itself in state and federal practice.9  I will then turn to a brief overview of 
the victims’ rights movement.10  Having laid a foundation of both pardon practice 
and the victims’ rights movement, I will then discuss the inherent difficulties of 
attempting to integrate victim interests into the unsettled nature of pardon 
practice.11  It is here that I will devote substantial discussion to the social science 
theory of procedural justice and assert that this framework can establish a measure 
of harmony between pardon practice and victim interests.  With that substantive 
foundation in place, I will engage in an examination of the In re Hooker decision, 
highlighting how that case exhibits many of the inherent and intractable challenges 
that exist when pardon practices and victim rights intersect.12 
 




From time immemorial, pardon practices have been part of organized 
government.13  And from the very beginning, pardon practice has served two 
seemingly irreconcilable masters—justice and mercy. 14  When speaking of justice, 
I do so in the classic retributivist stance of asking what is right or moral.15  From 
this perspective, a pardon is moral if it is what is deserved by the offender and can 
                                                                                                                                          
9   See infra Part II. 
10  See infra Part III. 
11  See infra Part IV. 
12  See infra Part VI. 
13  Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor’s Use 
of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 23–27 
(1994); Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 415–17; Ronald S. Everett & Deborah Periman, “The 
Governor’s Court of Last Resort:” An Introduction to Executive Clemency in Alaska, 28 ALASKA L. 
REV. 57, 60–62 (2011); Paul J. Haase, Note, “Oh My Darling Clemency:” Existing or Possible 
Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 1289–91 
(2002); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority 
in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1228–29 (2003); Silva, 
supra note 6, at 176–77. 
14  Haase, supra note 13, at 1287; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1500–06; Ridolfi, supra 
note 6, at 77–78; Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1415 
(2004). 
15  Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1501; Kobil, How to Grant Clemency, supra note 6, at 
219; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 580. 
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be legally justified as such.16  In contrast to this so-called justice-enhancing view 
of pardons, others proffer that pardons should be viewed through a more utilitarian 
or justice-neutral lens.17  Under this alternative approach, pardons exist outside the 
legal system, but such a-legality does not make pardons improper.  Rather, pardon 
exists as an act motivated by influences other than justice and hence is not bound 
by legal rules and structures.18  Under this approach, a pardon can serve as a 
vehicle to enhance broader political goals and extend mercy and grace to the 
offender.19   
Theoretically and practically, pardon practice has always embodied the dual 
themes of justice and mercy.  As a specific and integral part of the criminal justice 
system, pardon largely serves as an antidote to punishment, whether as a corrective 
measure or as an extension of executive grace.20  More broadly, pardons have 
served as a means to balance the powers among our political branches.21  These 
competing approaches have created an ever-repeating loop in how scholars and 
practitioners have examined pardon’s place within our judicial and political 
structures, and no one theory or practice wholly dominates. 
For example, Sir William Blackstone famously proffered that while the power 
to pardon was important for a monarch, “[i]n democracies . . . this power of pardon 
can never subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate 
who administers the laws; and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and 
of pardoning to center in one and the same person.”22  Blackstone seemed to be 
suggesting that vesting so much power in one branch of a democratic government 
was unwise and could result in abuse.  Conversely, Founding Father Alexander 
Hamilton claimed that the pardon power was necessary as a “benign prerogative” 
of the executive so that exceptions in favor of “unfortunate guilt” could be made 
                                                                                                                                          
16  Digeser, supra note 6, at 162; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 580; Love, Of 
Pardons, supra note 6, at 1501; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1502, 1510–12; Strasser, The Limits of the 
Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 89–90; Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President’s Pardon 
Power, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 143, 143 (2003) [hereinafter Strasser, Some Reflections]. 
17  Digeser, supra note 6, at 165–68; Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 417–20; Kobil, The 
Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 582–83; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1516–17; Sarat & Hussain, 
supra note 5, at 1311. 
18  Digeser, supra note 6, at 162; Dorne & Gewerth,, supra note 5, at 417–20; Love, Of 
Pardons, supra note 6, at 1502; Sarat & Hussain, supra note 5, at 1340; Strasser, The Limits of the 
Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 100–02; Weisberg, supra note 14, at 1415–16. 
19  Digeser, supra note 6, at 162; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1502–03; Sarat & Hussain, supra 
note 5, at 1322; Strasser, Some Reflections, supra note 16, at 143, 149–50. 
20  Ridolfi, supra note 6, at 78. 
21  Id. 
22  Lauren Schorr, Note, Breaking into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the 
Pardon Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1536–37 (2009) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *397). 
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lest “justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”23  Hamilton also 
asserted that executive pardon power was essential to maintaining peace within our 
nation, where in “seasons of insurrection” a grant of pardon to rebels or insurgents 
could preserve government structures.24  Hamilton appeared to be advocating that 
pardons were not only necessary to ensure that a defendant’s sentence was fair, but 
also that pardons could fulfill larger practical societal goals.  These competing 
positions of justice verses mercy repeat throughout any discussion regarding 
pardon practices. 
 
B.  Retributive Justice or Utilitarian Grace? 
 
The retributive or justice-enhancing theory for pardon is best credited to 
Kathleen Dean Moore and her influential monograph Pardons: Justice, Mercy and 
the Public Interest.25  In charting the fluid history and practice of pardons, Moore 
claims that the gift-giving nature of pardons should be abandoned, and that 
pardons should only be granted when morally mandated.  Echoing Blackstone’s 
concerns that the person executing the law should not also have the power to create 
exceptions to the law,26 Moore asserts that the gift-giving and mercy nature of 
pardons is inappropriate in a constitutional democracy where there should be little 
or no room for the unjustified and unexplained use of power.27  If pardons can be 
granted for any reason or no reason at all, then the practice can be easily abused.28 
Moore asserts that pardons should be evaluated in the same manner as 
criminal punishments—through the framework of retributivism.  Under the basic 
retributivist structure,29 a punishment should only be rendered against an individual 
to the extent that person deserves to be punished.  A punishment exceeding that 
which is deserved is unjust and unfair, just as a punishment that is too lenient is 
equally unfair.  According to Moore, the same reasoning should be applied to 
pardons.  Just as the government has a duty to punish only to the extent to which 
punishment is due, the government has a commensurate duty to pardon where an 
offender’s previously rendered punishment is otherwise unfair or unjust.  Hence, 
pardons should serve as a failsafe check on the punishment process and correct any 
errors in the state’s administration of justice.30   
                                                                                                                                          
23  Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 591 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447–
49 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also, Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1485 n.8 (discussing 
Hamilton’s view of the pardon power). 
24  Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 592. 
25  KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989). 
26  See Schorr, supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
27  MOORE, supra note 25, at 90. 
28  See infra notes 31–32, 36, 35, 51 and accompanying text. 
29  See supra notes 15–16, 26 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 169–174 and 
accompanying text. 
30  See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
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Under Moore’s model, unacceptable pardons would include those which 
promote the public welfare, promote the private welfare of the pardoner, and 
reward past positive actions of the offender.31  Additionally, pardons issued for 
pity’s sake, on the basis of recommendations by a judge, jury, or attorney, or based 
on sex, family, or social status, are unacceptable.32  As Moore explains, each of 
these instances represent a pardon granted for a reason other than to correct an 
otherwise undeserved punishment.33  Hence, a pardon that is granted for the health 
of the nation,34 or with the goal to gain the pardonee’s testimony in subsequent 
court proceedings,35 would be inappropriate.  The same could be said of “good will 
pardons” granted on national holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas,36 
rendered largely with the goal to increase the popularity of the grantor.  None of 
these reasons serve to ensure that an offender’s punishment is fair.  Therefore, 
Moore contends these pardons represent an inappropriate use of the practice.  
Moore’s justice-enhancing retributive approach to pardons has an inherent 
fairness to it and brings a “bright-line rule” quality to pardon practice.  If, under 
the standard precepts of retributivism, individuals are meant to be treated as moral 
agents responsible for their actions, but only their own actions, then punishment 
should be tailored to the individual’s specific acts.  Pardon fits within this model 
where it serves as a means to ensure that punishments are precise, fair, and just.  If, 
for whatever reason, the criminal justice system has not operated in a fair manner, 
the executive’s power to pardon ensures that the scales of justice are properly 
balanced.   
Despite the attractiveness of a justice-centered retributivist approach to 
pardon, Moore’s justice-enhancing theory is not without its critics.  First, 
determining what is a just and fair sentence is not a simple mathematical task.37  
Second, a closer examination of Moore’s differentiation between just and unjust 
pardons highlights that her groupings may not be as easily applied as one might 
like.38  For example, Moore proffers that lessening the determinate sentence for an 
                                                                                                                                          
31  MOORE, supra note 25, at 209.  See also Strasser, The Limits on the Clemency Power, supra 
note 6, at 93; infra note 82. 
32  MOORE, supra note 25, at 209.  See also Strasser, The Limits on the Clemency Power, supra 
note 6 at 93. 
33  MOORE, supra note 25, at 199. 
34  See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
35  MOORE, supra note 25, at 200.  See also Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).  
36  MOORE, supra note 25, at 201. 
37  Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 579–80.  Likewise, when crafting restitution 
awards for victims, courts have struggled with calculating victim losses and harms per the 
defendant’s wrongful acts.  See, e.g., Mary Margaret Giannini, Continuous Contamination: How 
Traditional Restitution Principles and § 2259 Undermine Cleaning up the Toxic Waste of Child 
Pornography Possession, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21 (2014); Mary Margaret 
Giannini, Slow Acid Drips and Evidentiary Nightmares: Smoothing out the Rough Justice of Child 
Pornography Restitution with a Presumed Damages Theory, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1723 (2012). 
38  Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 93–94.  
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offender who is dying of a fatal disease could be justified.39  If the prisoner is 
sentenced to 15 years, but is only likely to live for another three, the 15-year 
sentence would amount to a life sentence, rather than a set term of years.  Hence, 
the 15-year sentence would be unjust.  However, what if a pardon was granted in 
this setting not because of the alleged unfairness of the sentence, but rather, out of 
pity?40  Would the retributivist look the other way if the pardon could still be 
justified even if the executive’s reasons for the grant were not grounded in justice 
principles?  Likewise, what about the ailing offender who is released and then does 
not die?  Does the pardon become unjust because of the improved health of the 
offender?41  Finally, if a pardon, like a punishment, must be granted when it is 
moral and just to do so, then should it not be a mandated procedure?42  If an 
executive failed to pardon an individual as justice so required, would not the lack 
of pardon undermine the legitimacy of the pardon process of our criminal justice 
system as a whole?  In essence, under Moore’s retributive approach to the practice, 
executive pardons would have to become a final level of appellate review for any 
criminal matter.43  The executive branch would then be acting like a super-court 
operating outside the bounds of both Articles II and III of the Constitution.   
A second core criticism of Moore’s approach is that framing pardon practice 
and theory solely on retributivist grounds presents a crabbed and limited view of 
the power.44  Moore’s retributive approach disregards how pardons are placed 
within our federal and state constitutional structures and have been used 
throughout history.45  The reality is that pardon practice has always furthered more 
than simply rendering justice.  Therefore, while there is value in grounding a 
discussion about pardons with questions of just deserts,46 the discussion should not 
end there.  Rather, it should embrace the many other productive but justice-neutral 
reasons for which pardons are granted.47  
                                                                                                                                          
39  MOORE, supra note 25, at 173–75. 
40  Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 94; Strasser, Some Reflections, 
supra note 16, at 147. 
41  Strasser, Some Reflections, supra note 16, at 148. 
42  Digeser, supra note 6, at 164. 
43  Id.; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1502. 
44  Breslin & Howley, supra note 6, at 233–34; Digeser, supra note 6, at 164; Kobil, The 
Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 580–81; Kobil, How to Grant Clemency, supra note 6, at 219; 
Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1502–03. 
45  See infra notes 50, 53–63, 74, 115–119 and accompanying text. 
46  Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 581; Kobil, How to Grant Clemency, supra 
note 6, at 223. 
47  Digeser, supra note 6, at 162; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 581–83; 
Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1502–05; Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial 
Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy?, CRIM. JUST.,  Fall 2009, at 26, 27; Sarat & Hussain, supra note 
5, at 1311. 
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The a-legal, merciful, and grace-centered theory of pardon is allied with the 
utilitarian approaches to punishment and criminal justice.48  Rather than asking 
whether a pardon is morally just and deserved, this more nuanced and flexible 
approach recognizes that along with furthering justice, pardons can promote 
reconciliation and peace, relief from political strife, and perhaps even 
forgiveness.49   
Connected to the notion that kings and leaders were divine emissaries was the 
premise that a pardon was a gift.  Just as a god could bestow grace upon its 
supplicants, so too might a king or emperor.50  Pardons embodied this divine gift-
giving idea.  The downside, of course, to a gift-giving theory of pardons is that 
inherent in the nature of gift giving is discretion, and discretion is always 
accompanied with the risk of arbitrariness and abuse.  For this reason, Immanuel 
Kant, the father of retributivism, believed that any type of discretionary pardon 
power was entirely inappropriate in the criminal justice system.  He asserted that 
executive pardons represented “the most slippery of all the rights of the sovereign 
[by which] he can demonstrate the splendor of his majesty and yet thereby wreak 
injustice to a high degree.”51  Indeed, it is often when an executive exercises his 
discretion to grant a pardon that the practice receives its most negative press.52  
                                                                                                                                          
48  See supra notes 17–18, infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
49  Digeser, supra note 6, at 162, 166–68; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1528–34.  See also supra 
notes 17–18, infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
50  Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 419. 
51  Sarat & Hussain, supra note 5, at 1307 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 144 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing Company, 2d. ed. 1999) (1787)). 
52  MOORE, supra note 25, at 12.  See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 6, at 1130 (discussing the 
seemingly inappropriate 2010 posthumous pardon by Florida Governor Charlie Crist to the musician 
and rock star, Jim Morrison).  The pardon “appeared to reflect the instincts of a fan rather than a 
governor.”  Id.  In the meantime, the governor declined to address the appropriateness of pardoning 
specific juveniles serving life sentences.  Id. at 1130–31.  
For example, President George Bush, Sr.’s pardons of numerous individuals involved in the 
Iran-Contra controversy were viewed by many as a self-serving exercise to protect himself from 
investigations involving his alleged participation in the scandal.  See, e.g., Charles D. Berger, The 
Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is our Cynicism Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. 
REV. 163, 169 (1999); James N. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s 
Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 363 (1993); Robert Nida & Rebecca 
L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon 
Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 214–15 (1999); Peterson, supra note 13, at 1236–37.  See also Charles 
Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139, 140 
(2001) (listing broad presidential pardons from 1795 to 1977).  Similarly, President Bill Clinton was 
broadly criticized for the cavalcade of pardons he issued as he left office.  On his last day in office, 
President Clinton pardoned 177 individuals.  Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, 
at 1198.  Sidestepping the normal pardon application procedures followed by the U.S. Department of 
Justice Pardon Attorney’s Office, see infra notes 79–81, many of Clinton’s pardon decisions seemed 
to be driven by his intent to “reward friends, bless strangers, and settle old scores.” Love, The 
Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1198.  To the extent President Clinton hoped to leave 
office with a positive legacy, his pardon decisions muddied rather than cleansed his tenure.  Id. at 
1200; Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 738–41; Love, Fear of 
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C.  Pardon as a Mixed Practice 
 
The mixed theories for why we pardon have been evident in pardon practice 
from its inception.53  From the first moment a king or tribal leader exercised the 
power to punish a subject, that leader might also be found to exercise his grace to 
excuse or pardon those who had caused offense.  However, to the extent early 
pardons were viewed as an expression of divine grace, there was no question that 
pardons also served practical political goals.  Leaders used their pardon powers to 
quell rebellions, foster public peace, and bring healing to a nation after civil war or 
otherwise unpopular military activity.54 Similarly, a leader’s use of his 
discretionary pardon power could increase loyalty among his subjects.55  Hence, 
the pardon power has been used by leaders since its earliest days to fulfill a 
discretionary gift-giving function, as well as to bring about specific political and 
utilitarian goals. 
                                                                                                                                          
Forgiving¸ supra note 6, at 3.  In this regard, Clinton undermined the hopes of our founders that a 
president would exercise care in using his discretionary pardon power lest improvident decisions 
result in the “damnation of his fame to all future ages.” See Duker, supra note 6, at 503 (quoting 
JAMES IREDELL, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 351–52 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., Burt Franklin, 1968)(1787)).  See also Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 
6, at 1173 n.13; Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presidential 
Term, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 19 (2002).   
In contrast to President Clinton, and probably in reaction to the negative press associated with 
his actions upon leaving office, both President Bush, Jr., and President Obama have been quite 
circumspect in the use of their pardon powers.  For example, during his two terms as President, 
George W. Bush only granted 198 pardons out of the 2,498 requests he received.  See CLEMENCY 
STATISTICS, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).  President 
Obama has been equally careful in granting pardons, issuing relief to only 64 of the 1,866 requests he 
has thus far received.  Id. Perhaps heeding the warnings raised by our forefathers that an abuse of 
executive discretion would result in “damnation of [presidential] fame to all future ages,” Sisk, supra, 
at 19; Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 185, 187 (2003); Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1173 n.13; See 
also Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5, 6 
(2007) [hereinafter Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power]. Presidents Bush, Jr., and Obama 
have been so careful about using their executive pardoning discretion that they have hardly used it at 
all.  See also infra note 112. 
53  See generally Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 413–17 (discussing early history of 
pardon power); Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6. at 575, 583–84 (discussing the nature and 
origins of the clemency power). 
54  See Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 417–18 (discussing use of pardon to “subdue a 
restive populace, punish mutinous troops without destroying the entire army, foster public confidence 
in a new government following a revolution, heal deep divisions in a population torn apart by civil 
war, or fractured in the aftermath of an unpopular one, or avert a looming constitutional crisis”); 
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 584–85 (discussing early Roman use of pardon power 
to discipline mutinous troops through the process of decimation); Love, Reinventing President’s 
Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 6 (discussing political uses of the pardon power). 
55  See, e.g., Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 440; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 
6, at 571; Moore, supra note 6, at 282. 
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As our criminal justice systems developed, leaders also exercised their pardon 
power to correct seemingly harsh aspects of the criminal justice system.  In this 
regard, pardon practice fulfilled more justice-centric and retributive goals.  For 
example, at common law, all homicides were treated as felonies.  Therefore, 
pardon served as the only way to ensure that those who might otherwise not 
deserve punishment could be spared.56  Similarly, it was not until 1907 that federal 
prisoners possessed a statutory right to appeal their sentences.57  As a result, 
presidents used their pardon power routinely, often at the very bidding of judges, 
to soften what might otherwise be deemed harsh and unyielding criminal 
sentences.58  Hence, pardon practice has always served, in part, to ensure sentences 
were fair.  Pardons also fulfilled an important role within our government structure 
whereby the executive could check the other branches for seemingly overreaching 
in the crafting or application of laws.59 
                                                                                                                                          
56  See Duker, supra note 6, at 479.  Professor Duker describes a case dating from 1249 in 
which a four year old girl was imprisoned because in “opening a door, she accidentally pushed a 
younger child into a vessel of hot water, killing the child.”  Id.  Without pardon, the young girl would 
have to serve a full sentence.  Id. 
57  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 572; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 
52, at 6 n.10.   
58  See Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 735; Love, 
Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 6.  See also George Lardner, Jr., & 
Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon 
Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 212 (2004).  For example, in the early part of the 19th 
Century, federal criminal law mandated that courts impose “at least some sort of fine and/or some 
prison time, and sometimes a whipping, in almost every non-capital felony offense. . . . Many of the 
most frequently prosecuted categories of federal offenses carried mandatory minimum prison terms 
and fines, if not death.”  Id. at 213.  As a result, many judges, who otherwise felt bound to the 
criminal code, would nonetheless directly advocate to the president that defendants be pardoned.  Id.  
Examples ranged from a case regarding two, and likely foolish, young men who stole a hog, id. at 
215, cases addressing defendants who suffered from some form of diminished capacity, id., cases 
where the judges thought the sentence was inherently excessive, id. at 217, or cases in which there 
existed newly discovered evidence, id. 
59  For example, President Obama has recently taken action to commute sentences for 
individuals convicted under federal crack cocaine laws, asserting that laws under which the 
individuals where punished allowed for unfair sentencing disparities.  See David Jackson, Obama 
Commutes 8 Crack Cocaine Sentences, USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013, 4:53 PM),  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/12/19/obama-commutations-crack-
cocaine/4126693/; Brendan Kirby, Obama Commutes Life Sentences of Mobile, Birmingham Men 
Convicted of Crack Dealing, AL.COM, 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/12/obama_commutes_life_sentences.html (last updated Dec. 
18, 2014, 4:53 PM).  So doing, President Obama seems to be signaling to Congress and the courts 
that the current status of U.S. drug sentencing is in need of reform.  See also Hoffstadt, supra note 6, 
at 572–88 (providing examples of pardon being used to address mistakes or oversights by other 
branches of government); Lardner & Love, supra note 58, at 215 (providing an example of a lessened 
sentence for some foolish boys who stole a hog); Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1490 (noting 
one use for pardons is to correct a miscarriage of justice or defect in the underlying conviction); 
Ridolfi, supra note 6, at 48 (providing an example of king pardoning where punishment was 
otherwise unjust). 
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Pardons, however, have not always been used to advance justice-centered and 
retributive goals.  In the early twentieth century, the American criminal justice 
system refined many of its procedures while also adopting a host of rehabilitative 
ideals.60  Increased procedural protections, such as a right to counsel, the right to 
direct and collateral appeal, and defenses for diminished capacity, all sought to 
ensure that criminal sentences were appropriately tailored for a given defendant.61  
Hence, the apparent need for pardons as a justice-enhancing tool lessened.  At the 
same time, the parole system and indeterminate sentences highlighted the 
penological approach that punishment could serve to redeem and reform 
offenders.62  Instead of merely ensuring that an offender received his or her due, 
criminal sanctions were viewed as a means to reform and rehabilitate the 
wrongdoer.  If during his or her time of imprisonment, the offender could show his 
or her reformation, early release was possible.63  Hence, the criminal justice system 
appeared, at least to some measure, to have crafted better measures to ensure fair 
punishments, thereby undermining the need for pardons to serve as a corrective 
device.   
However, the rehabilitative model of punishing was short-lived and was 
declared by many as unsuccessful.64  Policy makers and judges increasingly 
stopped asking how an offender’s punishment might serve some sort of 
reformatory purpose, and instead questioned whether, in focused retributive terms, 
the punishment appropriately fit the extent of the offender’s crime.65  This 
generally “tough on crime” stance was reinforced by the “war on drugs,”66 leading 
many leaders to be wary about the political costs of extending any form of 
sentencing grace to offenders.67  Consequently, contemporary pardon practice is 
                                                                                                                                          
60  Everett & Periman, supra note, 13 at 69–70; MOORE, supra note 25, at 55–56. 
61  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 573–74; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1490–91; Love, 
Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 7. 
62  Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1494–95; Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 
supra note 6, at 1187–93; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1509–10. 
63  MOORE, supra note 25, at 59. 
64  MOORE, supra note 25, at 55–89; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1494–96; Love, 
Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 7; Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative 
of Pardoning, supra note 6, at 28–29; Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 
1193–94; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1509–10.  
65  See generally Everett & Periman, supra note 13, at 71; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 
1494–98; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 7; Rapaport, supra note 6 
at 1509–12; Silva, supra note 6, at 178–79.   
66  Drinan, supra note 6, at 1137–38; Everett & Periman, supra note 13, at 71; Love, Of 
Pardons, supra note 6, at 1495–96; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 
7; Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of Pardoning, supra note 6, at 28–30; Love, The Twilight 
of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1193–94; Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 47, at 32–33. 
67  MOORE, supra note 25, at 203–04; Ammons, supra note 13, at 48–51; Everett & Periman, 
supra note 13, at 71; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607–10; Love, Of Pardons, supra 
note 6, at 1497; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 8; Love, The 
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generally quite anemic,68 leading many to assert that it has become a living fossil,69 
a remnant of tribal kingship,70 or, like collar buttons, something that has long since 
outlived its usefulness and should silently fade away.71  Despite these negative 
bellwethers, the practice persists and continues to embody its seemingly contrary 
purposes of furthering merciful as well as retributive goals.    
At the federal level, the pardon power is structured in such a way to imply 
that it bends toward a discretionary gift-giving model.  The federal Constitution 
exclusively vests the pardoning power with the President and limits those powers 
only to the extent that pardons apply to federal offenses and cannot be granted in 
cases of impeachment.72  Congress may not curtail the President’s pardon power, 
and the Supreme Court has been reticent to review pardon decisions.73    
From a utilitarian and politically practical perspective, such discretionary 
executive power is desirable, if not vital, to effective governance.  As stated by 
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist No. 74, “in seasons of insurrection or 
rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to 
the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and 
which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to 
                                                                                                                                          
Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1171; Rapaport, supra note 6, at 1506–07; Ridolfi & 
Gordon, supra note 47, at 32–33.  
68  For the last thirty years, federal pardon practice has declined.  While it is impossible to 
pinpoint the precise reason for this decline, it is not unreasonable to credit a combination of the 
resurgence of retributive sentencing ideas, the tough on crime stance, and the perceived political 
costliness of granting grace to offenders.  See supra notes 51, 64–67 and accompanying text.  
Between 1932 and 1980, each year there were over 100 post-sentence pardons granted at the federal 
level.  Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1494–98; Silva, supra note 6 at 177–78.  However, starting 
with Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the rate of pardons dropped precipitously.  Love, Of Pardons, 
supra note 6, at 1494.  During his presidency, Ronald Reagan granted 393 pardons from 2099 
requests.  See Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 640.  His predecessors, Richard Nixon, 
Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, all granted far more given their terms of office.  Id.  Richard Nixon 
granted 863 pardons from 1699 requests.  Id.  Gerald Ford granted 382 pardons out of the 978 
requests he received.  Id.  Jimmy Carter granted 534 pardons out of the 1581 requests he received.  
Id.  Following the trend started by Reagan, George H.W. Bush granted 74 pardons out of 731 
requests, and Bill Clinton awarded a total of 396 out of 2001 requests.  See Clemency Statistics, supra 
note 52.  George W. Bush only granted 189 pardons out of the 2498 he received during his two terms 
in office.  Id.  Finally, at the time of writing, President Obama, now into his second term in office, 
has only granted 64 pardons out of the 2,078 requests he has received.  Id. 
69  Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 575. 
70  Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 735. 
71  Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1484 (citing MOORE, supra note 25, at 84). 
72  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”). 
73  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (Congress cannot limit President’s pardon 
powers).  See also Ammons, supra note 13, at 28–30 (discussing limited review of presidential 
pardon powers); Haase, supra note 13, at 1291–97 (same); Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, 
at 614–20 (same); Kobil, Compelling Mercy, supra note 4, at 699–702; Peterson, supra note 13, at 
1231–35; Strasser, Some Reflections, supra note 16, at 153–58; Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency 
Power, supra note 6, at 116–48.  See also infra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
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recall.”74  And indeed, throughout our nation’s history, Presidents have used their 
pardon power for such purposes.75   
Perhaps the most noted pardon from contemporary history is President Ford’s 
pardon of President Nixon.  In explaining his pardon decision to the American 
public—something he was not obliged to do—Ford emphasized how pardoning 
Nixon would serve as a means to heal the nation and allow the citizenry to move 
beyond the polarizing events which prompted Nixon’s resignation.76  Fearing the 
extensive time and energy the nation might otherwise devote to Nixon’s pending 
impeachment, Ford noted that   
 
 [d]uring this long period of delay and potential litigation, ugly passions 
would again be aroused.  And our people would again be polarized in 
their opinions.  And the credibility of our free institutions of government 
would again be challenged at home and abroad . . ..  As President, my 
primary concern must always be the greatest good of all the people of the 
United States whose servant I am . . ..  I cannot prolong the bad dreams 
that continue to reopen a chapter that is closed.  My conscience tells me 
that only I, as President, have the constitutional power to firmly shut and 
seal this book.  My conscience tells me it is my duty, not merely to 
proclaim domestic tranquility but to use every means that I have to insure 
it.77 
 
Hence, vesting within one person the power to extend grace and mercy within 
our government systems has served an important role in our nation’s history. 
Even federal pardons not aimed to restoring the tranquility of the 
commonwealth tend to be grounded in concepts of grace and mercy rather than 
                                                                                                                                          
74  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 587 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 444–49 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
75  For example, our first president, George Washington, pardoned individuals involved in the 
Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion in 1795.  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 587–589; Kobil, The Quality of 
Mercy, supra note 6, at 592.  Likewise, President Jefferson pardoned individuals who had been 
convicted under the Alien and Sedition Act.  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 589; Kobil, The Quality of 
Mercy, supra note 6, at 592.  Following the Civil War, both Presidents Lincoln and Johnson pardoned 
individuals who had fought against the Union.  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 590; Kobil, The Quality of 
Mercy, supra note 6, at 593; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 6.  In 
slightly more modern times, Presidents Ford and Carter extended amnesty to individuals who 
violated military draft laws or who were military deserters in the Vietnam conflict.  Hoffstadt, supra 
note 6, at 590.  President Bush, Sr., pardoned numerous individuals involved in the Iran-Contra 
controversy, claiming in part, that in doing so, he was seeking to heal divisions over complicated 
issues of national policy.  Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 883, 
887 (1992); Jorgensen, supra note 52, at 364–65; Sisk, supra note 52, at 17–18.  See also supra note 
51 and accompanying text. 
76  See generally Berger, supra note 52, at 166–68; Peterson, supra note 13, at 1235–36. 
77  Gerald Ford, Remarks Upon Signing a Proclamation Granting a Pardon to Former President 
Richard Nixon, White House (Sept. 8, 1974) (transcript available at 2001 WL 1750565). 
2015] MEASURED MERCY 103 
rendering justice.  Most federal pardon practice, while solely vested in the 
President’s discretion, is managed and overseen by the Pardon Attorney’s Office.78  
That office is charged with reviewing applications and making recommendations 
to the President, with the goal of ensuring completeness, consistency, and a-
political results in the pardon process.79  Federal statutes and regulations further 
guide that offenders may not even seek consideration for pardon from the office 
until five years after they have completed their sentences, or seven years if their 
crime was serious.80  The regulations further guide that pardons should be “granted 
on the basis of the petitioner’s demonstrated good conduct for a substantial period 
of time after conviction and service of sentence.”81  Hence, to the extent a pardon 
might serve to relieve an offender from an otherwise unfair or disproportionate 
sentence, the regulations guiding the Pardon Attorney’s Office undermine this 
goal.82  Instead, the federal regulations appear to be more focused on rewarding 
offenders for their reformation upon release from prison.   
Just as the history, practice, and theory surrounding the federal executive 
pardon power blends retributive and utilitarian themes, the United States Supreme 
Court’s examination of the practice is equally blended.  When discussing the topic, 
the Court has used language regarding grace and discretion as well as language 
suggesting that executive pardons are important aspects of a constitutional checks 
and balances system.83  However, mirroring contemporary federal practice,84 the 
                                                                                                                                          
78  Having existed in one manner or another since 1865, the Pardon Attorney oversees federal 
pardon applications and makes pardon recommendations to the president.  Haase, supra note 13, at 
1293–94; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1489; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, 
supra note 52, at 6; Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1179–87.  Governed by 
statute and regulations, see 28 C.F.R. § 1.0–1.10 (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 0.35–0.36 (2014), the Pardon 
Attorney’s work is entirely advisory and does not create enforceable rights in those applying for 
clemency.  Likewise, the Pardon Attorney regulations in no way “restrict the authority granted to the 
President under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.”  28 C.F.R. § 1.11 (2014).  Hence, the 
President may entirely accept the Pardon Attorney’s recommendations, reject them, or issue pardons 
entirely independently of the Office’s recommendations. 
79  Haase, supra note 13, at 1293–94; Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1489.   
80  Elligibility for Filing Petition for Pardon, 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2014).  See also Hoffstadt, supra 
note 6, at 580–81; Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 603. 
81  Hoffstadt, supra note 6, at 580 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 1–2.112 (Sept. 1997)). 
82  The Office’s work has also been criticized as furthering a bias against pardons.  If a pardon 
is meant, in part, to serve as a form of review as to the fairness of the prosecutorial process, then 
having pardon applications reviewed by the Department of Justice, the same office engaged in the 
initial prosecution of an offender, would appear to represent a type of conflict of interest.  Hence, the 
Pardon Attorney’s work has often been characterized as serving the interests of federal prosecutors 
rather than those seeking pardons.  Love, Of Pardons, supra note 6, at 1496–97; Love, Reinventing 
President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 7–8; Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra 
note 6, at 1194–95. 
83  See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (noting exclusive power of pardon in the 
president); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160–61 (1833) (noting pardon is an act of grace).  
Cf. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (noting pardon is inherent part of constitutional 
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Court tends to predominantly lean toward the discretionary gift-giving model for 
pardons, leaving the practice largely free from judicial oversight and legislative 
control.   
On limited occasions, the Court has suggested that the executive pardon 
power is meant to be a measured and cabined practice designed to check the other 
branches of government in the administration of criminal justice.85  In this regard, 
the Court has noted that the pardon power is an explicit part of the constitutional 
scheme86 and that pardons should be granted when in the “determination of the 
ultimate authority . . . the public welfare will be better served by inflicting 
[punishment] less than what the judgment fixed.”87  When considering pardon as 
an explicit part of our constitutional structure, the Court has suggested that it is not 
an entirely discretionary power and can be reviewed by the judicial branch to 
ensure that a pardon does not violate some other clause of the Constitution.88  For 
example, in Knote v. United States,89 the Court ruled that a pardon could not 
undermine the vested property rights in another individual.90  Likewise, in Burdick 
v. United States,91 the Court ruled that the President could not force an offender to 
accept a pardon which required the offender give up his Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination.92  Finally, in the context of death penalty 
appeals, some members of the Court have suggested that the pardon power serves 
                                                                                                                                          
scheme); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974) (“[T]he pardoning power is an enumerated power 
of the Constitution and . . . its limitation, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself.”). 
84  See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text. 
85  Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925). 
86  Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486.  See also Schick, 419 U.S. at 267 (“[T]he pardoning power is an 
enumerated power of the Constitution and . . . its limitations, if any, must be found in the 
Constitution itself.”). 
87  Schick, 419 U.S. at 267.  Accordingly, some have argued that if the pardon power is 
exercised to serve the public welfare, it must be justified in one manner or another.  Dorne & 
Gewerth, supra note 5, at 420. 
88  Schick, 419 U.S. at 266 (“The plain purpose of the broad power conferred by § 2, cl. 1, was 
to allow plenary authority in the President to ‘forgive’ the convicted person in part or entirely, to 
reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, or to alter it with conditions which are in 
themselves constitutionally unobjectionable.”). 
89  95 U.S. 149 (1877). 
90  Id. at 154.  See also infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text. 
91  236 U.S. 79 (1915). 
92  Id. at 90–92.  Burdick represents one of the few cases where the Court has indicated that a 
presidential pardon crossed a constitutional boundary and was inappropriate.  Conversely, in Hoffa v. 
Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974), a federal district court ruled that a pardon containing 
conditions that allegedly infringed upon a defendant’s First Amendment speech and association rights 
was nonetheless valid because the pardon’s conditions were appropriately tailored in accordance with 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  Id. at 1239–41.   
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as a “fail safe” check for the innocent,93 and, accordingly, some measure of 
minimal procedural safeguards should accompany the practice.94   
Despite the Court’s hints that the executive’s pardon power should not be 
entirely unfettered, the Court’s decisions nonetheless bend heavily toward 
characterizing the practice as grounded in grace.  The Court predominately refers 
to pardons as gifts motivated by the discretionary grace of the executive,95 even in 
those cases where it also discusses potential limits on pardon practice.96  In 
viewing pardon as a gift, the Court has rejected arguments that an executive’s 
reasoning for granting a pardon can be reviewed or curtailed by the legislative and 
judicial branches.97  If gift giving is a discretionary activity, questioning the 
reasons for why the gift was bestowed undermines the inherently unrestricted 
nature of gift giving.  Moreover, despite the Court’s slight suggestions that pardon 
requests in death penalty cases should be accompanied with some measure of 
procedural safeguards,98 the Court has nonetheless explicitly stated there is not a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in a right to pardon.99  
Likewise, the Court’s reference to minimal procedural safeguards was indeed 
minimal at best.  Justice O’Connor has suggested that judicial review of a pardon 
process might be “warranted in the face of a scheme whereby [an official] flipped a 
coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the [government] 
                                                                                                                                          
93  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“Executive clemency has provided a ‘fail 
safe’ in our criminal justice system.  It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human 
beings who administer it, is fallible.”); id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
overwhelming evidence of innocence would compel an executive pardon). 
94  Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288–94 (1998) (O’Connor, J. and 
Stevens, J., concurring).   
95  United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160–61 (1833) (“A pardon is an act of grace . . . 
which . . . is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual 
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court.”). 
96  See, e.g., Woodard, 523 U.S. at 280–81, 285 (the executive’s clemency authority would 
cease to be a matter of grace if it were constrained by procedural requirements); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 
413 (quoting and citing Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160–61); Burdick, 236 U.S. at 89–90 (pardon is an act of 
grace granted by the executive); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1877) (same). 
97  Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284–85; Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 263–64 (1974); United States 
v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
98  Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
99  Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67–68 (2009) 
(“[N]oncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in traditional state executive clemency, to 
which no particular claimant is entitled as a matter of state law.”) (emphasis in original); Woodard, 
523 U.S. at 280 (“[A] petition for commutation, like an appeal for clemency, ‘is simply a unilateral 
hope.’”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (the possibility of clemency does not create an 
enforceable right in a defendant); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465, 467 
(1981) (there is no protected liberty interest in commutation or clemency).  See also McQueen v. 
Patton, 118 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1997); Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1423–24 (11th Cir. 1988); Binion v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 695 
F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.”100  However, the 
Court has never on procedural grounds afforded judicial review to an individual 
challenging the lack of pardon relief.101  Hence, even though the Court has 
fleetingly described the pardon power as a justice-enhancing tool, those references 
are limited by the Court’s fealty to the otherwise discretionary aspects of the 
power.   
If one views pardon as a discretionary gift, then under the political question 
doctrine, the ground upon which one can challenge a pardon decision is all the 
more limited.102  The Constitution’s text guides that the President “shall have 
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, 
except in Cases of Impeachment.”103  There is nothing in this language, nor any 
other language in the Constitution, to suggest that this power is shared or otherwise 
checked by another branch of government.  Hence, not unlike the Senate’s power 
to oversee impeachments,104 or Congress’s overall power to expel one of its 
members,105 the executive should be left to his or her individual devices when 
making pardon decisions.  Therefore, so long as a pardon does not violate other 
portions of the Constitution, a presidential pardon is generally unreviewable.106 
The highly discretionary nature of federal pardoning makes it very difficult 
for anyone to challenge its grant or denial thereof.  A challenger could try to make 
a case that the President’s actions rose to the level of an impeachable offense.107  
This option has limited utility considering many presidents (and governors) 
exercise their pardon power as they are exiting office.108  A challenger could also 
express his displeasure regarding an executive’s pardon decision by exercising his 
                                                                                                                                          
100 Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
101 See generally Kobil, How to Grant Clemency, supra note 6, at 235–36; Kobil, Compelling 
Mercy, supra note 4, at 723–28; Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 123–34; 
Strasser, Some Reflections, supra note 16, at 157–58 (discussing Supreme Court’s limits on 
procedural review of pardons). 
102 Haase, supra note 13, at 1300–01; Kobil, Compelling Mercy, supra note 4, at 704; Kobil, 
The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 618–20; Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra 
note 6, at 139–43. 
103 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (the senate has the “sole power to try all Impeachments.”).  See 
also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.  See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 507 (1969). 
106 See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.  Scholars have also suggested that there 
may be limited grounds to challenge a pardon decision where it might violate an individual’s 
fundamental rights or the Equal Protection Clause.  See Kobil, Compelling Mercy, supra note 4, at 
714–23; Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 117–23; Strasser, Some 
Reflections, supra note 16, at 153–57.  However, the likelihood of success on these claims is far from 
assured, and an appropriate remedy for an otherwise unsound pardon or denial of one, equally 
unclear.  Kobil, Compelling Mercy, supra note 4, at 722–23. 
107 Sisk, supra note 52, at 18. 
108 Id. 
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or her political voice, and not vote again for the President.109  For example, some 
have attributed President Ford’s pardon of Nixon to his 1976 loss of the presidency 
to Jimmy Carter.110  However, the threat of a lost election is again a reason why 
many executives delay their pardon decisions until they are exiting office.  Finally, 
a challenger could hope that the President’s concerns regarding his historical 
legacy might temper otherwise improvident or unpopular pardon decisions.111  
Here, the founders presumably hoped that the “damnation of fame to all future 
ages”112 would lead presidents to exercise restraint when making pardon decisions.  
Certainly, Clinton’s last minute pardons were not received well by the American 
public,113 and Governor Barbour’s pardons were equally reviled.114  However, none 
of these methods to challenge a pardon decision assure the challenger any 
immediate relief, thereby reinforcing the overwhelmingly discretionary aspect of 
the power.  
The states address the pardon power in measurably similar ways to how the 
power is administered by the federal government.  Under their individual 
constitutions, the states have crafted a variety of methods by which the pardon 
power is exercised.  A majority of states, like the federal government, have vested 
the pardon power primarily in the governor, who can seek advice from some sort 
of pardoning board if he or she so chooses.115  In these states—like Mississippi, out 
of which the In re Hooker case originated—the rules and rationales surrounding 
                                                                                                                                          
109 Id. at 18–19. 
110 Brenton Becker, The History of the Nixon Pardon, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 44–45 (2000); 
Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum, 4 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 72 n.361 (1993); Sisk, supra note 52, at 18; Allen L. Williamson, Note, 
Clemency in Texas—A Question of Mercy?, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 136 n.38 (1999).  
111 Sisk, supra note 52, at 19. 
112 See id.; Love, The Pardon Paradox, supra note 52, at 188 n.10; Love, The Twilight of the 
Pardon Power, supra note 6, at 1173 n.13; Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 
52, at 6. 
113 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra note 1, infra notes 230–236 and accompanying text. 
115 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7; 
HAW. CONST. art. V, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; IND. CONST. art. V, §17; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 16; 
KY. CONST. art. LXXVII; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 11; MD. CONST. art. II, § 20; MISS. CONST. art. 
V, § 124; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2, cl. 1; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4; N.C. 
CONST. art. III, § 5(6); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; OR. CONST. art. V, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3; 
TENN. CONST. art. III, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 20; VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 
9; W.VA. CONST. art. VII, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 5.  See also 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE, 34–35 (William S. Hein & Co. 2006) (providing 
list).  In some instances, state law vests the entire pardoning power in the governor, while in other 
settings, the governor may seek the advice of a pardon board or be subject to procedural limitations 
laid out in statute.  Id. at 34–35.  See also Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at table 2 (organizing the 
states slightly differently); Van Camp, supra  note 4, at 1285–90 (same). 
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how one might challenge a pardon decision mirror opinions of the federal courts.116  
Other states have created shared power models between the governor and a review 
board.  In some states, a pardon decision is reached collectively by the governor 
and an independent board.117  In other shared environments, the governor is the 
final decision maker, but only after consulting with the state pardon board.118  
Finally, and departing most dramatically from the federal model, six states entirely 
strip the governor of any pardoning power and place the pardon solely within the 
authority of an independent board or body.119   
                                                                                                                                          
116 See, e.g., State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 115 (Alaska 1981) (non-capital defendants do not 
have a liberty interest in state executive clemency); Schwartz v. Owens, 134 P.3d 455, 459 (Colo. 
App. 2005) (inmates do not possess a due process right to clemency); People v. Lyons, 618 P.2d 673, 
675 (Colo. App. 1980) (executive branch has the sole authority to modify sentence after final 
conviction); People ex rel. Gregory v. Pate, 203 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ill. 1964) (power to pardon belongs 
to the governor and cannot be undermined by the legislature or court); Jackson v. Rose, 3 S.W.2d 
641, 643 (Ky. 1928) (court does not have power to review a governor’s grant of pardon); Elliott v. 
Kentucky, 45 F. Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (court does not have power to review governor’s 
grant, or lack thereof, of pardon); Chestnut v. State, 524 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Me. 1987) (statute which 
attempted to commute an existing sentence is an unconstitutional infringement of governor’s power 
to pardon); Pope v. Wiggins, 69 So.2d 913, 915 (Miss. 1954) (governor’s constitutional power to 
pardon cannot be limited by other branches of government); State v. Mangino, 86 A.2d 425, 427 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (power to pardon is vested solely in the governor); People ex rel. 
Page v. Brophy, 248 A.D. 309, 310 (N.Y. 1936) (governor’s power to pardon cannot be otherwise 
limited by statute or the courts); Ex parte Bustillos, 194 P. 886, 888 (N.M. 1920) (ultimate power to 
pardon is vested in the discretion of the governor); State ex rel. Rowe v. Connors, 61 S.W.2d 471, 
472 (Tenn. 1933) (power to grant pardons belongs to the governor and cannot be controlled by the 
courts or legislature); In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 51 A. 10, 11 (Vt. 1901) (governor’s 
pardon power cannot be restricted by the legislature); State ex rel. Stafford v. Hawk, 34 S.E. 918 (W. 
Va. 1900) (power to pardon is vested in the governor and cannot be restricted by the courts); 
Kennedy v. State, 595 P.2d 577, 578 (Wyo. 1979) (possibility of commutation is a matter left to the 
discretion of the governor and not the courts). 
117 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 5: DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); 
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, art. VIII; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; 
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 52; NEV. CONST. art. 
V, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9(a); R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 13; TEX. 
CONST. art. IV, § 11(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(A) (2004); MONT. CODE § 46-23-301-307, 315-
316 (2004).  See also Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at table 2 (organizing the states slightly 
differently); Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 605 n.232 (same); Love, Reinvigorating 
the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 745–47 (same).    
118 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 7: MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 14; MO. 
CONST. art. IV, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11.  See also Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon 
Power, supra note 74, at 32 (providing list); Dorne & Gewerth, supra  note 5, at table 2 (organizing 
the states slightly differently); Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 605 n.233 (same); Love, 
Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 747–48 (same). 
119 See ALA. CONST. amend. XXXVIII (amending art. V § 124); CONN. CONST. art, IV, § 13; 
GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. II; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14; UTAH CONST. 
art. VII, § 12.  See also Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 23–24 
(providing list); Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at 427–28 (organizing the states slightly 
differently); Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 605 n.234; Love, Reinvigorating the 
Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 744–45 & n.62.  
2015] MEASURED MERCY 109 
State practices vary widely in how pardons are administered.  For example, in 
a majority of states, even those in which the governor has the final authority to 
issue a pardon, some sort of review board oversees the investigation and data 
collection for pardon applications.120  State pardon hearing procedures also vary 
across the nation, including full board hearings, ex parte review, use of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and partial due process rights for the applicant.121  Finally, a 
majority of states require that victims receive notice of a pardon application.122  
Because each state has crafted its own pardon structure, it is difficult to draw 
any absolute conclusions about state pardon practice.  Nonetheless, some broad 
trends can be identified.  First, pardoning on the state level appears to impose far 
more immediate political consequences on governors than on presidents.123  For 
example, at least one governor has been impeached and removed from office for 
granting pardons to the highest bidder,124 while another governor’s pardon 
practices (again, including the sale of pardons), resulted in his federal prosecution 
for conspiring to take kickbacks on liquor store licenses.125  Similarly, governors 
have suffered in subsequent elections due to their pardon decisions.  For example, 
Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld pardoned a series of individuals associated 
with the 1887 bombing of Chicago’s Haymarket Square.126  The public reaction to 
his pardons was swift and fierce, and he was not elected to a second term.127  
Similarly, former Ohio Governor Michael DiSalle partially attributes his 1962 loss 
of the governor’s mansion to his death sentence commutation of several 
individuals.128  Hence, if only out of fear of political criticism, pardon practice on 
the state level is far from robust.129 
Perhaps correlated to the fear of political reprisal from unpopular pardons, 
studies also indicate that where a state’s pardon power is not vested solely or 
predominately with the governor, the overall rate, frequency, and speed by which 
                                                                                                                                          
120 See Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at table 8.  See also supra notes 78–82 and 
accompanying text. 
121 Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 5, at table 9. 
122 Id. at 10. 
123 Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607–11; Love, Reinventing President’s 
Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 18; Barkow, supra note 6, at 153–55; Dinan, supra note 6, at 392. 
124 Dinan, supra note 6, at 392 (citing Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607); 
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607 (referencing the 1923 impeachment of Oklahoma 
Governor J.C. Walton). 
125 Dinan, supra note 6, at 392 (citing Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607); 
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607 (discussing Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton’s 
prosecution in the 1980s for activities associated with his pardon activities). 
126 Kobil, The Quality of Mercy, supra note 6, at 607. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 19–20; Drinan, supra note 
6, at 1129–30; Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its 
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 291–97 (2003). 
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pardons are granted is higher than in other states.130  Likewise, where governors 
have the option of receiving advice from a pardon board, governors appear slightly 
more inclined to issue pardons.131  In these settings, governors are more likely to 
have the sense that their decisions are bolstered and validated by the board’s 
recommendation, and hence are less concerned about a negative response from 
their constituents.132   
When examining pardon practice on both the federal and state levels, it is 
evident that executive pardon power is a hybrid creature.  Its practical application, 
along with how scholars and courts have attempted to ground it in legal theory, 
highlights that pardon power embodies both justice-enhancing goals and justice 
neutral goals.  Using the pardon power as a means to ensure fairness in our 
criminal justice system suggests that the practice should be mandatory, subject to 
articulated reasons by the grantor, and reviewable by the courts.  Conversely, 
pardons have been granted to further goals that are far more political and utilitarian 
in nature.  Here, the gift-giving nature of the practice strongly implies that pardon 
decisions should be left entirely to the executive and not be subjected to strenuous 
judicial review or oversight.  And indeed, most pardon practice has been treated 
accordingly. 
What we are left with is a practice that sits uneasily between justice and grace, 
both in its utilization and in its theory.  The problem with this teetering balance is 
that if it is difficult for offenders to challenge the grant or denial of a pardon, 
fitting crime victims into the balance is all the more precarious.   
 
III.  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS PRACTICE AND THEORY 
 
Victims’ attempts to have their interests acknowledged in criminal justice 
proceedings have represented an ongoing tension for state and federal governments 
since the founding of our country.133  For most of our nation’s history, victims 
have been relegated to a limited role in the prosecution of defendants.134  Victims 
have been called upon by the government to serve as witnesses or evidence, but 
have otherwise been largely disregarded and treated as Victorian children who 
should be seen and not heard.135   
                                                                                                                                          
130 Love, Reinventing President’s Pardon Power, supra note 52, at 20–21, 23–26; Love, 
Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 744–51. 
131 Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 6, at 747–51. 
132 Id.   
133 Barajas & Nelson, supra note 7, at 8–11; Cardenas, supra note 7, at 371; Cellini, supra 
note 7, at 845; Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
134 Barajas & Nelson, supra note 7, at 11; Cardenas, supra note 7, at 372; Cellini, supra note 
7, at 849; Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 26. 
135 Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1101, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006); Barajas & Nelson, supra note 
7, at 11.   
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The victim’s traditionally narrow role within the criminal system is predicated 
largely on the public prosecution model.136 Under this model, crime is not viewed 
as the act of a perpetrator which caused harm to an individual victim.  Rather, the 
public prosecution model views the defendant’s acts as such a gross violation of 
what is accepted behavior in civil society that the state should exercise its power to 
recognize and punish such wrongs.137  Hence, crime is viewed as having been 
committed against the state.138  The ensuing prosecutorial battle is framed between 
the state’s interests in preserving peace, righting the social order, and punishing 
wrongdoers, and the defendant’s interest in asserting his innocence or at least 
being fairly prosecuted for his illegal acts.139  Within this structure, there are only 
two acknowledged parties with interests in the proceeding: the state and the 
defendant.  The victim is generally not included within the matrix. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, victims began to chafe against their treatment 
under the public prosecution model and mobilized to address the criminal justice 
system’s failure to adequately acknowledge the variety of needs and interests 
victims brought to a criminal proceeding.140  Despite the physical, financial, and 
emotional harms victims suffered at the hands of an offender, many victims felt 
even more abused by the state in the course of the defendant’s prosecution.141  As 
                                                                                                                                          
136 Barajas & Nelson, supra note 7, at 10–11; Cardenas, supra note 7, at 371–72; Tobolowsky, 
supra note 7, at 25–26.  This was not always the case.  In some of our earliest government structures, 
victims controlled the prosecution of those who had committed crimes against them.  See generally 
Cellini, supra note 7, at 841; Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural 
Justice, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to be Reasonably Protected from the 
Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 74 (2010) [hereinafter Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise]; 
Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 23; Thad H. Westbrook, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South 
Carolina Responds to Victims' Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REV. 575, 577 (1998). 
137 See, e.g., Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise, supra note 136, at 74–75. 
138 Scholar Casare Beccaria is credited with advancing the argument that crime is not a private 
matter between the victim and perpetrator, but rather represents a broader societal concern.  
Cardenas, supra note 7, at 366–72.  Therefore, the proper focus for the criminal justice system was on 
societal needs, and not the needs of individual victims. Id.  See also Mary Margaret Giannini, Note, 
The Swinging Pendulum of Victims' Rights: The Enforceability of Indiana's Victims' Rights Laws, 34 
IND. L. REV. 1157, 1198 (2001) [hereinafter Giannini, The Swinging Pendulum]; Barajas & Nelson, 
supra note 7, at 8–9; Cellini, supra note 7, at 847–48 (criminal prosecutions should serve societal 
interests of deterrence and retribution rather than interests of individual victims in private redress); 
Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 25–26 (goals of the criminal justice system focus more on vindicated 
harms done to society as opposed to harms suffered by the individual); Twist, The Crime Victims' 
Rights Amendment, supra note 7, at 369. 
139 Cardenas, supra note 7, at 371–72. 
140 See generally Aaronson, supra note 7, at 623; Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests, 
supra note 7, at 1138–39; Cassell, supra note 7, at 861; Kyl et al., supra note 7, at 613; Tobolowsky, 
supra note 7, at 28–30. 
141 See, e.g., Senate Floor Statements in Support of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 105 CONG. 
REC. S460, S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 
62, 64 (2006); DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (2d ed. 2006); 
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 289, 293–98 [hereinafter Beloof, The Third Model]; Edna Erez, Victim Voice, Impact 
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noted by one victim, my “sense of disillusionment with the judicial system is many 
times more painful [than the crime itself].  I could not, in good faith, urge anyone 
to participate in this hellish process.”142   
In response to overwhelming victim dissatisfaction, grassroots organizations 
fostered increased governmental awareness of crime victims.143  The efforts of 
victim advocates took a quantum leap in 1982 after the release of the Final Report 
of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime.144  The Task Force was 
established by President Reagan and was charged to “conduct a review of national, 
state and local policies and programs affecting victims of crime,”145 and to “advise 
the President and Attorney General with respect to actions which can be 
undertaken to improve . . . efforts to assist and protect victims of crime.”146  The 
Task Force recognized that there was no quick fix to the criminal justice system’s 
seeming disregard of victims,147 and issued over sixty specific recommendations to 
better integrate victims within the criminal justice process.148   
Energized by the Task Force’s recommendations, nearly every state has 
passed victims’ rights laws,149 and over thirty states have passed victims’ rights 
                                                                                                                                          
Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles 
in Adversarial Proceedings, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 483 (2004); Kyl et al., supra note 7, at 613; Ilyssa 
Wellikoff, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent Crimes: On the Way to Justice, 5 CARDOZO 
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (2004), http:// www.cardozojcr.com/issues/volume-5-1/note-1/. 
142 Barajas & Nelson, supra note 7, at 15 n.47.  
143 See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 7; Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests, supra note 7, 
at 1138–39; Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.3 (1984) (discussing California's passage in 1965 of the first 
victims' compensation legislation); Cassell, supra note 7 at 865–70; Cellini, supra note 7, at 853; Kyl 
et al., supra note 7, at 613; Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 28–30. 
144 Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17975 (April 23, 1982).    
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Kyl et al., supra note 7, at 584. 
148 Id.; Tobolowsky, supra note 7, at 29–30.  Among these recommendations were ensuring 
that police and prosecutors kept victims informed as to the status and progress of the prosecution of 
the individual who had committed the crime against the victim, setting up systems to ensure that 
prosecutors effectively communicated to the court a victim’s views on charging and release 
decisions, allowing for more victim-impact statements at sentencing, granting restitution to victims, 
and allowing victims and their family members to be present at trials, even where they were called as 
witnesses. Finally, the Report advocated the passage of an amendment to the United States’ 
Constitution providing victims with protected rights.  Cassell, supra note 7, at 865. 
149 State statutes have included providing victims with the right to be informed of the status of 
their case, see e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.015(a)(2) (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.03 (Deering 
2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-2 (LexisNexis 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1844.A (LexisNexis 
2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530 (2014); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 56.08, 56.11–.12 
(LexisNexis 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-13-14.7(2)-(4), 77-38-3 (LexisNexis 2015); and the right 
to be heard at any proceeding involving sentencing or post-conviction release decisions.  See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 960.001(1)(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2015); MISS. CODE 
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amendments to their constitutions.150  On the federal level, the effort to pass a 
victims’ rights amendment to the United States Constitution has not yet been 
successful,151 but Congress has passed numerous laws ensuring that victims are 
more integrated into the criminal process.152 
Generally, federal and state laws provide victims with a number of 
opportunities to have a more direct role in the prosecution of those who have 
committed crimes against them.  Under the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
[CVRA],153 victims have been afforded with a litany of rights, including  
 
 [t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused; [t]he right to 
reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or 
any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of 
the accused; [t]he right not to be excluded from any such public court 
proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing 
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially 
altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding; [t]he right 
to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court 
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding; [t]he 
reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the 
case; [t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law; [t]he 
right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; [and t]he right to be 
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and 
privacy.154 
 
                                                                                                                                          
ANN. § 99-36-5(1)(e) (LexisNexis 2014); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.02(a)(5) (LexisNexis 
2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.030(13) (LexisNexis 2015). 
150 Thirty-two states have passed victims' rights amendments to their constitutions.  See ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I., § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 
28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a; CONN. CONST. amend. XXIX; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15; 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLVII; MICH. CONST. art I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. 
III, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. 
1, para. 22; N.M. CONST. art II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; TENN. 
CONST. art. I, 35; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m. 
151 See generally Cassell, supra note 7, at 865–70; Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise, 
supra note 136, at 103; Kyl et al., supra note 7, at 596. 
152 See, e.g., Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2000); The Victims' 
Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 10,606 (2006); The Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 
42 U.S.C. § 10,601 (2006); The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 
Stat. 1248 (1982). 
153 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006). 
154 Id. at § 3771(a)(1)-(8). 
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Similarly, numerous federal statutes provide victims with the right to seek 
restitution from their offenders, as well as general compensation and other 
assistance from government sources.155  State-based victims’ rights laws afford 
similar protections to victims.156  These laws are not solely aspirational.  Victims 
have experienced a measure of success in exercising their rights in state and 
federal criminal actions.157   
However, crime victims are still not fully integrated into the public 
prosecution model.  Some victims’ rights are difficult to define and therefore are 
difficult to grant or enforce.158  For example, many states, as well as the federal 
government, assert that victims have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, 
and respect.159  However, legislators have provided little guidance as to what is 
                                                                                                                                          
155 See, e.g., Victim Witness and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663–3664); Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647,  § 2509, 
104 Stat. 4789, 4863 (Nov. 29, 1990); Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 
106 Stat. 3403 (1992) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228); Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1904 (Sept. 13, 1994); Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, 18 
U.S.C. § 3663A.  
156 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; 
CONN. CONST. amend. XVII; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 
25; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 
37; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 
24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9(m); ALASKA STAT. § 
12.55.045 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-101.5(6)(a) (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 
(LexisNexis 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991f (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-103 (2014). 
157 In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (district court required to consider whether 
individuals should be afforded victim status under the CVRA); United States v. Belfort, No. 98-CR-
0859, 2014 WL 2612508 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014) (court protects victim privacy in the context of 
releasing information about restitution award); United States v. Camick, No. 13-10042-01-JTM, 2014 
WL 644997, *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2014) (court bars individual from filing court actions against 
victims where such actions represent a form of witness retaliation); Pann v. Warren, No. 5:08-CV-
13806, 2010 WL 2836879 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2010) (victims have the right to be heard by a court 
on matters of restitution); J.D. v. Hegyi, 335 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Ariz. 2014) (parents or guardians who 
assert victim rights for minors will still be protected by the victim rights laws when the child reaches 
the age of 18); State v. Pumphrey, 338 P.3d 819, 824 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (victim could receive 
restitution for safety measures taken by the victim in response to the defendant’s actions); State v. 
Brown, 342 P.3d 239, 242 (Utah 2014) (victims should be afforded limited purpose party standing in 
a criminal case when seeking restitution).  
158 See e.g., In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining who is a victim under the 
CVRA); In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285 
(11th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. 
Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453 (D. N.J. 2009) (same); United States v. 
Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2006) (same). 
159 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2006); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 
2.1(a)(1); CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28; COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-1-302.5(1)(a) (2014); CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. I. § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; KAN. STAT. § 74-7333(a)(1); LA. 
CONST. art. I, § 25; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. 
art. III, § 26A; N.H. Stat. § 21-M-8-k.II(c); N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; 
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embodied in such a set of rights,160 much less what would serve as an appropriate 
remedy in response to a violation.  Likewise, many state and federal laws provide 
victims with a right to be protected from the accused.161  However, almost all 
would agree that such a right does not ensure that the state can guarantee no further 
harm will befall the victim at the hands of the accused.162  Hence, one is left 
guessing as to what substance exists within this right.163   
                                                                                                                                          
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34.A; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(2); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(a); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A(1); WIS. 
CONST. art. I, § 9m. 
160 For example, in speaking on the floor of the Senate in support of the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, Arizona Senator Jon Kyl addressed in a general manner what he perceived to 
be “fair” treatment of crime victims.  He stated  
[T]he right to fairness for crime victims and the right to notice and presence and 
participation are deeply rooted concepts in the United States of America.  This country is 
all about fair play and giving power to the powerless in our society. . . .  Fair play for 
victims, meaningful participation of crime victims in the justice system, protection 
against a government that would take from a crime victim the dignity of due process—
these are consistent with the most basic values of due process in our society. 
Senate Floor Statements in Support of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 105 CONG. REC. S460, S4269 
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 62, 63 (2006).  
However, unlike his discussion of other portions of the law wherein the Senator, along with Senator 
Feinstein, provided far more specific detail regarding what victims might expect in terms of the rights 
afforded to them under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, see generally, 150 CONG. REC. S4260-01, 
2004 WL 867940 (Thursday, April 22, 2004), the Senator’s words regarding a victim’s right to 
dignity were sparse. 
161 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 
2.1(A)(1); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(3); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(7); 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(6); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(3); OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 10a; OR. CONST. art. I, § 43(1)(a); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(6); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(2); 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(2); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A(1); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m; 18 U.S.C. § 
3771(a)(1); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.010(4) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5(a) (2014); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 801D-4(3) (2015); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-40-5-1(2) (LexisNexis 2015); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 74.7333(7) (2014); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-1002(4) (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 258B § 3(d) (2015); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-36-5(1)(a) (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-
1848(c) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k(II)(c) (2014); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 646-a (2014); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 215.33(A)(2) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3(3) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-28C-1(4) (2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 56.02(a)(1) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 7.69.030(4) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-504(c) (2014).  See also generally Giannini, 
Redeeming an Empty Promise, supra note 136. 
162 When the CVRA was presented to Congress, one of its sponsoring legislators, Senator Jon 
Kyl of Arizona, stated “Of course the government cannot protect the crime victim in all 
circumstances.  However, where reasonable, the crime victim should be provided accommodations 
such as a secure waiting area, away from the defendant before and after and during breaks in the 
proceedings.” 150 CONG. REC. S10910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  The Federal 
Attorney General Guidelines regarding victim services under the CVRA exhibit a similarly limited 
understanding of the victim’s protection right.  The Guidelines direct that, where possible, separate 
waiting areas should be provided to victims at trial or at parole hearings and that victim protection 
services could aid “a victim in changing his or her telephone number[,] to the extreme measure of 
proposing the victim for inclusion in the Federal Witness Security Program.”  The Guidelines 
nonetheless make clear that the victim’s protection right should not be construed to “require personal 
protection of a victim, such as by bodyguards.”  See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, OFFICE OF 
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An allied problem victims have faced is that even in circumstances in which 
they can raise a colorable claim that their rights have been violated, it can often be 
difficult for them to obtain relief from the courts.  Even if a court concludes that a 
victim has standing to raise a claim, a court may decline to extend relief to the 
victim.164  Likewise, even if the victim’s rights have been violated, providing a 
remedy to the victim could undermine a defendant’s established constitutional 
rights.165  At bottom, despite the increased integration of victims within the 
criminal process, the primary adversarial relationship remains between the state 
                                                                                                                                          
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN., GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS 
ASSISTANCE 30–32, 35 (2005).  See also, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419–421 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting limited judicial interpretation of right, and questioning whether the right 
provides anything to victims); United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (providing limited review of the victim's right to be reasonably protected from the accused); 
Eric Blondel, Victims' Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 269 (2008); Giannini, 
Redeeming an Empty Promise, supra note 136, at 47–48. 
163 But see United States v. Camick, No. 13-10042-01-JTM, 2014 WL 644997 (D. Kan. 2014) 
(providing relief to victims from intimidation and harassment from defendant). 
164 See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (declining to 
permit victim to exercise hearing rights based on the court’s determination that victim information 
was not relevant to release determination); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 
2011) (declining to award restitution because it “is likely to be a rare case where the government can 
directly link one defendant’s viewing of an image to a particular cost incurred by the victim”); United 
States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) (victim impact and psychological evaluation were 
made prior to defendant’s possession of images, therefore proximate cause could not be established); 
United States v. Covert, Crim. no. 09-332, 2011 WL 134060, *9 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (evidence did not 
indicate how victim suffered additional harm upon learning of defendant’s possession of her images); 
United States v. Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d 335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (government failed to present 
evidence as to how defendant’s specific acts caused victim’s losses). 
165 See, e.g., Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291 (Md. 1995) (declining to award relief to victims 
despite clear violation of rights, where to do so would infringe on defendant rights); People v. 
Pfeiffer, 523 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (same).  In contrast to crime victims, who have 
struggled to have their interests in a criminal proceeding recognized by statute and by state 
constitutional law, American law has long enshrined constitutional protections to criminal 
defendants.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (search and seizure rights); U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(grand jury, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and due process rights); U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(speedy and public trial by impartial jury, confrontation, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, 
assistance of counsel rights); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (limits on excessive bail or cruel or unusual 
punishments).  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (suspect must be given notice of 
his right to an attorney before the police may question the suspect); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963) (defendant has right to assistance of counsel on first appeal of right); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (defendant has fundamental right to assistance of counsel where 
punishment will include incarceration); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the constitution is inadmissible); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
406 (1965) (accused has right to be confronted with witnesses against him).  See also generally Mary 
Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the 
Crime Victims' Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 431, 484 (2008) [hereinafter Giannini, Equal 
Rights]; Giannini, The Swinging Pendulum, supra note 138, at 1198; Lynne N. Henderson, The 
Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 942–48 (1985); Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson 
Powell, With Disdain for the Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 371 (2000); Westbrook, supra note 136, at 579–80. 
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and defendant.  As a result, victims’ interests are consistently ranked below the 
interests of the state and defendant.  
The difficulty of integrating victims into criminal proceedings is highlighted 
all the more when one attempts to think about victims’ rights in relationship to 
executive pardons.  Given that there lacks firm consensus as to whether, why, and 
how we should include pardon practice within our legal system,166 trying to insert 
victim interests into that already swirling mass of functioning disorder is no easy 
task.   
 
IV.  THE MESSY INTERSECTION OF PARDON PRACTICE AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
 
In similar fashion to the debates as to whether pardon should be categorized 
as a grace- and utilitarian-furthering function or as a justice-enhancing retributive 
tool,167 comparable conversations have surrounded the victim’s place within the 
criminal justice system.168  And just as there lacks clear consensus regarding 
pardon practice, the theories and foundations for victim involvement in the 
criminal justice system continue to evolve.   
When trying to find the best fit between a retributive or utilitarian approach to 
prosecution and punishment, victims traditionally have not been as welcome in the 
former construct and instead have established more ground in utilitarian structures.  
However, any such argument gets upended when viewing victims within a pardon 
system.  Through this prism, a retributive or justice-enhancing model may be the 
area where victims can establish a steadier gait.  However, that potentially solid 
ground is undermined by the inescapably grace-centered aspects of pardon 
practice.  Hence, within the orbit of pardon practice, victims often find themselves 
floating and untethered. 
To the extent our criminal justice system is designed to mete out justice in a 
retributivist fashion, prosecutions and their attendant punishments must be fair.169  
                                                                                                                                          
166 See supra Part II.  
167 Id. 
168 See generally Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the 
Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000); Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of 
Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255 (2005) [hereinafter 
Beloof, The Third Wave]; Beloof, The Third Model, supra note 141, at 293–98; Cardenas, supra note 
7, at 357; Blanche Bong Cook, Stepping Into the Gap: Violent Crime Victims, The Right to Closure, 
and a Discursive Shift Away from Zero Sum Resolutions, 101 KY. L.J. 671 (2012); Lynne N. 
Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victims’ Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
579 (1998); Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, supra note 165; Jody Lyneé Madeira, “Why 
Rebottle the Genie?”: Capitalizing on Closure in Death Penalty Proceedings, 85 IND. L. J. 1477 
(2010); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008); 
Erin Sheley, Reverberations of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and the Cultural 
Project of Punishment, 87 IND. L.J. 1247 (2012); Leo Zaibert, The Ideal Victim, 28 PACE L. REV. 885 
(2008). 
169 See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just Punishment,” 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 855–67 (2002); Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of 
118 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 13:1 
The defendant should be held fully responsible for the harms he or she caused, but 
no more or no less.  In this context, a victim’s personal desires for vengeance, 
which are often characterized as out of proportion to the defendant’s true 
wrongdoing, are deemed misplaced.170  Nonetheless, appropriately measured 
information from the victim regarding the extent of harm caused by the defendant 
helps ensure a retributively sound response to the crime.171  Here, while the 
prosecutorial contest remains one between the state and the defendant, the victim’s 
harm and suffering plays a central role in calculating the scope of the defendant’s 
full liability.172  The deficit in this position is that while it creates space for the 
victim, victims are nonetheless confined to the role of witness and, perhaps even 
worse, mere evidence.173  Hence, while the victim may be asked to provide 
important information, the victim is often left feeling limited and devalued.174  
Therefore, victims may have a place within a retributivist approach to prosecution 
and punishment, but the fit leaves many dissatisfied. 
Conversely, to the extent our criminal justice system is designed to further 
broader utilitarian goals,175 there may exist more space for victims.  Utilitarians 
view a defendant’s punishment as a means to prevent future evils and wrongs.176  
A punishment should serve to improve society rather than to merely calculate the 
                                                                                                                                          
Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California’s Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 202–
04 (1990); George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 51, 52–53, 60–63 (1991); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73–74, 
76–79 (2005); Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise, supra note 136, at 79; Matthew Haist, 
Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of “Limiting 
Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 793–94 (2009); Henderson, The Wrongs of 
Victims’ Rights, supra note 165, at 991–93.  See also supra notes 15–16, 26 and accompanying text. 
170 See generally Bandes, supra note 168, at 1605–06; Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of 
Delegated Revenge, 87 B. U. L. REV. 1059, 1063–64, 1072 (2007); Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice 
and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 
WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1149 (2005); Fletcher, supra note 169, at 52; Giannini, Redeeming an Empty 
Promise, supra note 136, at 79–80; Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for 
Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 244 (1991); Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 165, at 994–95; Sheley, supra note 168, at 1252–53; Zaibert, supra note 168, at 886. 
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costs of the defendant’s acts.177 Therefore, punishment is not solely about 
determining just deserts, but also about finding ways to deter future crime and 
rehabilitate the offender.178  Because the utilitarian approach to punishment is 
broader, there is more room for the victim’s voice.   
As between the retributive and utilitarian approaches to prosecution and 
punishment, victims appear to stand on firmer ground under the latter construct.  
Here, the criminal justice system is not narrowly focused on the relationship 
between the defendant and the state, but takes a broader view of the many goals 
and purposes that could be achieved through the prosecution and punishment of an 
offender.  Hence, one might initially contend that a victim-centered utilitarian 
criminal justice system would align with a utilitarian focused pardon system.  
However, a utilitarian foundation for victims’ rights does not necessarily merge 
with ease into the utilitarian and grace-focused nature of pardon practice.   
First, while utilitarian theory does generally cast a wider perspective when 
evaluating the value of a prosecution or punishment,179 its manifestation in the 
pardon context tends to be narrower.  As a utilitarian practice, pardon does focus 
on the broader social and political gains that could be accomplished through the 
gift of pardon,180 but often to the exclusion of victims.181  Second, a grace-centered 
pardon construct does not provide an easy avenue for victims to challenge the 
executive’s pardon of an offender.  Under a grace construct of pardon, even 
defendants are limited in their ability to challenge the denial or scope of a pardon 
grant.182  In rejecting defendant requests for court oversight in the pardon process, 
courts have characteristically emphasized that a pardon is a gift and hence 
something to which the defendant is not entitled.183  Third, given that the courts 
view pardons as something to which defendants are not absolutely entitled, any 
challenge raised as to the process by which pardons are granted is limited.  
Without a legitimate underlying property interest, fair procedures are unnecessary 
or only required in the most limited of fashions.184  The Court has also rejected the 
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argument that a statutory grant of process can rise, in and of itself, to the level of a 
protected property interest.185 
It must nonetheless be acknowledged that in Knote v. United States,186 the 
Supreme Court did indicate that a pardon decision could not infringe upon a vested 
property right.187  In this context, however, the Court was speaking specifically 
about forfeited real property owned by the defendant and subsequently sold by the 
government.188  The Court indicated that once the property was sold and fully 
vested in another, the defendant’s subsequent pardon could not undermine the 
vested rights in the new property owner.189  Therefore, in suggesting that a pardon 
could not undermine vested property rights, the Court was focused on real property 
directly implicated by the defendant’s conviction, rather than any potentially 
broader concepts of property rights or interests.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court 
has developed its jurisprudence around protected property interests, it has 
expressed an unwillingness to expand such interests too broadly.190  None of this 
bodes well for crime victims seeking to challenge an executive’s pardon grant.   
Just as a defendant is not entitled to a pardon, a victim is not entitled to see 
the offender serve a full sentence.  Nor do any of the processes which might 
accompany the grant or denial of a pardon rise to the level of being a protected 
entitlement.191  Finally, even if there did exist legally recognized pardon interests 
in both victims and defendants, the courts would eventually have to tip the scales 
in favor of one party or the other.  So doing, we would likely find ourselves back 
to the uncomfortable reality that a criminal prosecution and any accompanying 
pardons are first and foremost deemed a relationship between the offender and the 
state, with the victim relegated to a secondary position.192 
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The silver lining for victims in a grace-centered pardon practice is that both 
state and federal executives appear increasingly aware of the political costs that 
accompany unchecked discretion and therefore tend to exercise their power with 
care.193  Hence, there is ground to postulate that when a pardon is not granted, the 
executive’s denial of such grace may have been prompted by the recognition that 
victim interests outweigh the value of any grace bestowed on the offender.  
However, given that most pardon structures emphasize the inherently discretionary 
nature of the act, the grant or denial of grace need not be explained.  Hence, where 
a pardon is denied and therefore could possibly be viewed as incorporating victim 
interests, that position can only be verified should the executive actor, in his or her 
discretion, decide to share the reasoning behind the pardoning decision.194  But 
absent articulated reasons, one cannot be assured that the motivating force in 
denying a pardon request represented an executive response to victim interests, as 
opposed to the executive’s concern about maintaining political power or 
establishing a sound legacy.  Given the breadth of concerns that infiltrate a 
utilitarian approach to criminal justice, victim voices may simply be drowned out 
by other concerns.  Therefore, the grace and utilitarian construct for pardon 
practice imposes a variety of barriers to formalized victim involvement.   
Conversely, there may be more room for victims within a retributive and 
justice-focused framework of pardon practice.  While victims have normally had 
less of a place in retributivist discussions,195 the opposite may be true within the 
context of pardon practice.  Under this construct, the traditional focus has sought to 
ensure the appropriate and fair punishment for the offender, without the seemingly 
emotional distractions of victim responses to the crime.196  Pardons should only be 
issued as a means to ensure that the offender is punished no more or no less than 
he or she absolutely deserves, serving as an ultimate appeal or check on all the 
criminal justice processes.197 
However, if a pardon is meant to ensure a fair punishment, victim input is 
important and necessary.198  While measuring and calculating the depth of harms 
caused by offenders to their victims may be undoubtedly difficult,199 failing to hear 
from victims would undermine assurances that a defendant’s punishment and any 
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potential pardon is indeed fair and just.200  Hence, even as a mere witness, the 
victim’s voice plays an important role in furthering justice.  
Unfortunately, despite the general predominance of retributive theory in our 
criminal justice system, a retributive mold of pardon practice has not entirely taken 
hold.201  Federal and state laws overwhelmingly treat pardon practice as a 
discretionary executive activity outside the normal checks and balances of our 
government branches.202  Only in the narrowest of situations have courts willingly 
reviewed, much less overturned, pardon decisions or the lack thereof.203  
Characteristic of the courts’ analyses is a recognition that pardons are driven by 
discretion and grace, as well as shielded from judicial review through separation of 
powers and the political question doctrine.204  Hence, to the extent a more 
retributive-focused version of pardon practice might encourage more attention on 
victim interests, the wall of grace stands in the way. 
The difficulty in both pinning down pardon practice as well as establishing a 
settled place for victims within the criminal justice system makes it equally 
challenging to determine how the two should intersect.  As developed in the 
foregoing discussion, that intersection appears just as fluid and slippery as the 
topics themselves.  However, there remains an avenue that could work with the 
unsolidified nature of both concepts and allow for a more unified and satisfactory 
process.   
 
V.  MEASURED MERCY THROUGH PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
 
As I have written elsewhere, the intentional integration of procedural justice 
theory into our criminal justice system could go a great distance in reconciling 
some of the difficulty in including victims in our judicial processes.205  In using the 
phrase procedural justice, I am not referring to standard rules of criminal procedure 
or the constitutional concept of procedural due process.206  Rather, procedural 
justice theory is a social science discipline which examines individual satisfaction 
with official decisions based on the perceived fairness of the process by which the 
decisions were reached, as well as how individuals were treated in the decision  
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making process.207  The theory has developed into two different branches, one 
focused on process control and the other on group value.208   
Under the process control theme of procedural justice, social scientists have 
examined individuals’ acceptance of a decision based on the individuals’ 
perception of whether the process by which the decision was reached was fair.209  
In criminal settings, where a process was perceived to be fair, even where the 
outcome was unfavorable to individual defendants, the defendants were 
nonetheless more likely to comply with the final decision and tended to have lower 
recidivism rates.210  Under the process control model of procedural justice, the 
fairer the process is perceived to be, the more likely those impacted by the 
outcome will view that outcome as legitimate.   
When thinking about the process control model as applied to crime victims, 
one must recall that much of the criminal justice system cannot function without 
the cooperation and input of victims.211  It is often the victim who reports the 
crime, provides evidence to the police, and testifies at trial.  Crime victims who 
perceive that the process by which crimes are investigated and prosecuted is fair 
will be more likely to continue to report crimes, provide evidence, and participate 
in trial.212  These positive perspectives are likely to spill over into broader society 
and result in a citizenry that bears more faith in the workings of the criminal justice 
system and that is therefore more likely to cooperate and share information with 
authorities in order to aid the system’s smooth functioning.213 
The second strain of procedural justice theory goes deeper.  Rather than just 
inquiring as to whether the decision making process is perceived to be fair, the 
group value approach focuses on how decision makers treat participants in the 
decision making process.214  This aspect of procedural justice proffers that an 
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individual’s perceptions of fair treatment contribute to the individual’s sense of 
acceptance and integration in society.215  When a person encounters a neutral 
decision maker who appears to be caring and trustworthy, treats everyone with 
dignity, and gives all before him or her the opportunity to be heard, that individual 
is more likely to believe they are honored members of their society and therefore 
tends to extend additional legitimacy to the decision making system in which they 
are involved.216  Collectively, therefore, procedural justice theory proffers that 
legal systems that strive to administer fair processes, while also treating in a 
dignified and respectful manner those who are subjected to those processes, will be 
systems that are respected, used, and upheld by their citizenry.   
Integrating procedural justice theory into executive pardon practice should 
make intuitive sense.  Procedural justice theory is about ensuring fairness in 
processes, regardless of the outcome.  Given the varied and discretionary nature of 
pardon practice,217 coupled with the unsettled place of victims within the criminal 
justice system,218 a theory that encourages broad unifying themes of fairness is 
welcome and needed.  Moreover, overlaying procedural justice principles to 
pardon practice could bring to the fore certain retributive principles raised by those 
who have expressed concern about the grace and utilitarian focused nature of 
pardons.219  For example, Kathleen Dean Moore, the predominant advocate for a 
retributively grounded pardon practice, has argued that in a democracy there 
should be very little room for discretionary, unexplained, and un-reviewed uses of 
executive power.220  Even if procedural justice practices did not transform pardons 
into a fully retributive practice, the theory could go a great distance in ensuring 
that whatever the pardon outcome, those affected by the outcome believed the 
decision was reached in a fair manner with accompanying fair treatment of all 
involved.   
So what might a pardon practice infused with procedural justice principles 
look like?  In many regards, it would capitalize on much that the states and federal 
government are already doing, but would be more explicit in doing so.  First, a 
robust procedural justice pardon practice would include a strong educational 
component so that anyone touched by the process would understand its steps, 
scope, and limits.  So doing, all involved, offenders and victims alike, would 
understand what to expect from the process and any of its potential outcomes.  
Even if an offender or victim was unhappy to learn that the governor or president 
had largely unfettered discretion to make his or her decision, at the very least, the 
offender or victim would have that knowledge, and could manage his or her 
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expectations accordingly.  Second, a procedural justice pardon practice should 
systematically utilize oversight and processing units, such as the Federal Pardon 
Attorney’s Office or state pardon boards.221  Doing so would create efficiency for 
both the decision maker as well as those seeking to influence that decision.  The 
pardon attorney office or pardon board could serve as the central clearinghouse for 
education and information gathering, as well as information transmission.  
Moreover, by having aspects of the decision making process somewhat centralized, 
much of the mystery which often accompanies the pardon process would be 
minimized.   
Allied to the centralization of the pardon process, a procedural justice 
approach to pardon would also intentionally gather information from defendants, 
victims, and other interested parties regarding the providence, or lack thereof, of a 
pardon grant.  So doing, the procedural justice goal of treating all parties with 
respect would be furthered.  Likewise, a system in which all relevant voices are 
heard, even if the ultimate decision is discretionary, would imbue the process with 
an increased sense of legitimacy.  Finally, the individual or body granting the 
pardon should be strongly encouraged, if not required, to provide an explanation to 
the public for the pardon decision.  Of course, in acknowledging the inherently 
discretionary nature of pardons, any proffered explanation would be just that—an 
explanation.  However, despite the absence of any formal judicial review of the 
pardon explanation, the explanation would nonetheless be subject and available to 
public scrutiny.  Decision makers, concerned about their legacies, might therefore 
be tempered from rash or improvident decisions.222  All told, these practices, many 
of which exist in some form already within current pardon practice, would cabin 
the otherwise discretionary practice of pardon with soft retributive bookends.  
Without eradicating the longstanding grace-centered nature of executive pardons, 
procedural justice practices could bring increased legitimacy to the practice by 
bolstering victim, offender, and societal perceptions that the process was also 
motivated by notions of fairness and justice. 
There is no easy or tidy way to untangle the Gordian knot presented by 
pardon practice and victims’ rights.  Despite the ancient lineage of pardon practice 
and the far more recent vintage of victim rights, both share the characteristic of 
lacking a clear home or foundation within the criminal justice system.  The 
nomadic natures of both make it difficult to bring the two together in a cohesive 
fashion, even though the two inevitably intersect.  Procedural justice theory, while 
broad in its construct, nonetheless provides a means to bring some unification to 
the two.  Animated by the overall desire to infuse trust and legitimacy to 
government structures and decision making processes, procedural justice theory 
emphasizes the importance of fair treatment and fair processes, even if in the 
context of highly discretionary and fluid situations.  Hence, its use and integration 
in the criminal justice system, and particularly in the pardon context, could go a 
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great distance in improving victim, defendant, and societal views of pardon 
practice.  This leads one to question whether if the Mississippi pardon process was 
more grounded in procedural justice principles, the governor’s decisions, and 
public reaction to the same, could have been different. 
 
VI.  THE IN RE HOOKER DECISION 
 
Returning full circle to the Mississippi governor’s 2012 pardons and In re 
Hooker decision,223 one can see the multiple complexities of pardon practice and 
victim rights in full force, along with the court’s missed opportunity to integrate 
procedural justice theories into the state’s executive pardon practice. 
A majority of Governor Barbour’s pardons were uncontroversial.  Nearly 
ninety of those pardoned were no longer in state custody, and of those still in 
custody, the governor granted “ten full pardons; thirteen medical releases; one 
suspension of sentence; one conditional, indefinite suspension of sentence; and one 
conditional clemency.”224  The governor’s actions nonetheless received national 
attention because some of those who received full pardons had been convicted of 
violent crimes.  For example, one defendant had been involved in a robbery and 
shot the victim in the face when the victim mistook the defendant robber as 
someone coming to the victim’s aid.  The shot was fatal.225  Another pardoned 
individual shot his ex-wife in the head as she held their young child in her arms.226  
He shot another man who was also in the room and left him for dead.227   
When challenged in the press for his actions, the governor declined to discuss 
or justify his decision.  However, after leaving office, he issued a press release 
which stated: 
 
Some people have misunderstood the clemency process and think that all 
or most of the individuals who received clemency from former Gov. 
Haley Barbour were in jail at the time of their release.  Approximately 90 
percent of these individuals were no longer in custody, and a majority of 
them had been out for years.  The pardons were intended to allow them 
to find gainful employment or acquire professional licenses as well as 
hunt and vote.  My decision was based upon the recommendation of the 
Parole Board in more than 90 percent of the cases.  The 26 people 
released from custody due to clemency is just slightly more than one-
tenth of one percent of those incarcerated.228 
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The governor was also cited as justifying the pardons on the ground that many 
of those who had been convicted of murder had acted in a heat of passion, and 
were therefore less likely to commit such acts again.229  However, surviving victim 
Randy Walker challenged that premise, asserting that the defendant had engaged in 
premeditated murder.230   
The last-minute nature of the governor’s pardons also raised public ire.  
Because the governor issued the pardons as he was exiting office, he preempted 
any political impact the pardons might have had on his authority and power.231  
While many individuals were unhappy with the governor’s decision, there were 
few to no avenues to challenge his actions.  For many of the impacted victims, the 
governor’s actions left them feeling entirely disregarded, in fear, and not at all part 
of the picture.232  
Upon learning of the pardons, surviving victim Randy Walker reported that he 
felt “like [his] safety was in jeopardy,”233 and went on to say, “I wonder if [the 
defendant] is going to finish what he’s started.”234  Another victim stated, “I think 
the governor himself ought to look me in the eye and say, ‘Hey, I let this guy go.’  
But there wasn’t any of that.  That’s the coward’s way out, if you ask me.”235  
Hence, the individuals who bore the direct impact of the convicts’ actions, and 
perhaps received the most relief from the defendants’ convictions, were left feeling 
ignored and disenfranchised from a decision that could have a direct impact on 
their lives.236   
Allied to these concerns was the fact that the governor’s pardons allegedly 
failed to comply with the state constitutional requirement that all pardons be 
preceded by a thirty-day publication period.  It was this claimed defect that served 
as the basis of the state attorney general’s lawsuit asking the state supreme court to 
void the pardons as unconstitutional.   
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In In re Hooker, the state court was specifically asked to review whether the 
governor had complied with the state constitution’s language regarding pardon 
procedures.237  The attorney general’s civil action asserted that he had “reason to 
believe that Former Governor Barbour’s attempted pardons . . . were in violation of 
Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution,” and requested the trial court to 
“declare all pardons it found to be in violation of Section 124, null, void, and 
unenforceable.”238  Section 124 of the Mississippi state constitution guides that  
 
 [i]n all criminal and penal cases, excepting those of treason and 
impeachment, the governor shall have the power to grant reprieves and 
pardons . . . [I]n cases of felony, after conviction no pardon shall be 
granted until the applicant therefor shall have published for thirty days, 
in some newspaper in the county where the crime was committed, . . . his 
petition for pardon, setting forth  therein the reasons for why such a 
pardon should be granted.239 
 
The state supreme court narrowed its scope of review to a single question: 
“[W]hether the judicial branch of government has constitutional authority to void a 
facially-valid pardon issued by the coequal executive branch, where the only 
challenge is compliance with Section 124’s publication requirement.”240  In a 
focused opinion, the court determined that the state’s constitution exclusively 
reserved the pardon power to the executive branch, and therefore, under a 
separation of powers and political question analysis, the court lacked jurisdiction to 
review the governor’s actions.241  The court further suggested that the state 
constitution’s publication requirement established, at most, a process by which the 
governor was meant to issue a pardon, rather than any type of protected individual 
property right.  Therefore, in the absence of an alleged justiciable violation of a 
personal right,242 the court had no grounds to address whether the governor’s 
actions were inappropriate, much less whether his actions violated victims’ rights.  
At its very core, the court’s decision made clear that it lacked jurisdiction to 
evaluate the lawfulness of the governor’s pardons. 
The state court’s decision embodies many of the quandaries that have 
challenged courts, scholars, and members of the executive branch who grant 
pardons.  In particular, the In re Hooker decision shines a spotlight on four 
different, but interrelated, matters.  First, the decision questioned the purpose of the 
pardon publication requirement and concluded it existed solely as a tool for the 
                                                                                                                                          
237 See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
238 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012). 
239 MISS. CONST. art. V, § 124.  
240 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 403. 
241 See infra notes 245–254, 268–274, 280–287 and accompanying text.  
242 See infra notes 245–254, 268–274, 280–287 and accompanying text. 
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governor to gather information to help him decide whether to grant a pardon.  
Therefore, it was a procedure that was unreviewable by the courts.  Second, this 
conclusion raised the broader question of what role and purpose the pardon power 
serves within our judicial and governmental structure.  Mirroring the messy 
landscape of pardon jurisprudence and scholarship, the In re Hooker majority held 
true to the grace-centered approach to pardon,243 while the dissenting justices 
presented a mix of theories regarding the practice.244  Third, and largely because of 
the court’s marked lack of a discussion on the impact the governor’s pardons 
would have on crime victims, the In re Hooker decision is instructive because of 
the questions it raises regarding the extent to which the executive pardon power 
should take into consideration, if at all, the interests of crime victims.  Finally, 
throughout the entire arc of the In re Hooker controversy, one can observe any 
number of missed opportunities for the court to overlay procedural justice theory 
onto its pardon analysis and allow for a more satisfactory process for all involved. 
From the outset, the court signaled its view that the executive pardon power is 
discretionary in nature and hence largely unreviewable.  By grounding its analysis 
within the context of justiciablility, the In re Hooker court indicated that pardons 
are certainly an important part of any governmental system, but exist outside legal 
and court structures.  Blending the allied principles of separation of powers and the 
political question doctrine, the court invoked the seminal case of Marbury v. 
Madison245 for the proposition that a court’s primary role is to “decide on the rights 
of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform 
duties in which they have a discretion.  Questions, in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court.”246  Then quoting from a key political question case, Nixon v. 
United States,247 the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that it would be 
inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction over a case where there was a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it.”248  The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that in Nixon, the Supreme 
Court declined to review an impeached judge’s allegations that the process by 
which he was removed from office did not comply with the federal Constitution.  
                                                                                                                                          
243 See supra notes 48–50, 54–55, 95–101 and accompanying text. 
244 See infra notes 256–267 and accompanying text. 
245 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  In Marbury, the Supreme Court addressed, in part, whether it had the 
power to require the executive branch to perform specific functions—in this instance, delivering a 
commission letter to a recently appointed justice of the peace.  The Court concluded that where the 
executive action was purely ministerial, the judicial branch could mandate executive action, but that 
where the executive action was otherwise discretionary in nature, the Court should honor separation 
of powers principles and not police the actions of a co-equal branch of government.  Id. at 170. 
246 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 405 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170). 
247 506 U.S. 224 (1993).  
248 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 405 (quoting Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (internal citations omitted)). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that to do so “would be mandating and regulating a 
procedure specifically committed to the Senate—not the Court . . . [and that] the 
Senate must function independently and without interference from another branch 
in order to maintain the constitutional separation of powers.”249  Just as it was 
inappropriate for the Supreme Court to review impeachment procedures which had 
been assigned by the Constitution to be within the Senate’s purview, so too was it 
inappropriate for the Mississippi court to review pardon procedures which had 
been assigned to the governor by the state constitution.250  The constitutional 
assignment of the pardon power to the executive branch indicated that this was an 
activity that existed outside of the judicial process and was vested in the governor 
alone.251  
The In re Hooker court nonetheless acknowledged that in limited 
circumstances, executive pardons could still be reviewed by the judicial branch.  
From the very start of its opinion, the court sent a very strong message that, absent 
an allegation of a “justiciable violation of a personal right,”252 it would not assume 
“the absolute power to police . . . other branches of government in fulfilling their 
constitutional duties to . . . execute orders.”253  So doing, the Mississippi court 
impliedly mirrored how the Supreme Court has approached its power to review 
pardons.  Unless the grant or denial thereof is alleged to violate an otherwise 
acknowledged constitutional or vested property right, the court has declined to 
inquire into the wisdom or reasoning of the executive’s grant of mercy.254   
Central to the Mississippi governor’s power to issue a pardon was the state 
constitution’s publication requirement.  However, the Mississippi court reasoned 
that unless the publication requirement vested within identified individuals a 
personal or property right, the question of whether the publication requirement was 
satisfied solely rested with the governor.255  The divided court wrestled with 
                                                                                                                                          
249 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 405–06. 
250 Id. at 406.  It must be noted that not all state courts take a narrow view of their pardon 
review power.  See, e.g., Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, supra note 6, at 144–48 
(discussing some state courts who have overruled pardon decisions where those decisions have not 
complied with state constitutional notice and formality requirements).  Hence, the Mississippi court 
certainly could have extended its scope of judicial review.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4 (suggesting 
that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s In re Hooker decision extended the boundaries of the political 
question doctrine too far). 
251 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 412 (citing Pope v. Wiggins, 69 So. 2d 913, 915 (Miss. 1954)) 
(“Under Section 124 of the Constitution of 1890, the power to grant pardons and to otherwise extend 
clemency, after the judicial process whereby one has been convicted of a crime has come to an end, is 
vested in the governor alone.”). 
252 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 402. 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915) (pardon powers cannot be used 
to undermine other constitutional rights); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (a pardon 
cannot undermine the vested property rights existing in another individual). 
255 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 411.  In stating this proposition, the court relied on State v. 
McPhail, 180 So. 387 (Miss. 1938).  In McPhail, the governor, concerned with the lawlessness in a 
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competing theories regarding whether the publication and notice provision created 
a vested personal or property right that, if violated, could permit the court to 
review a challenge to a gubernatorial pardon.   
The dissenting justices, implicitly integrating procedural justice theories into 
their analyses, asserted that the state constitution’s publication and notice 
requirements existed for the benefit of the citizenry to ensure that the pardon 
power was properly executed.  Each of the dissenting justices grounded their 
argument on the proposition that the pardon power should not be described as 
belonging to the governor.  Rather, the pardon power was something that belonged 
to and emanated from the people and was subsequently entrusted to the governor 
by the people through the state constitution.256  The dissenting justices painted a 
picture of the pardon power as an extension of grace from the people to be 
exercised by the governor.257  Under this construct, the governor could not exercise 
this constitutionally granted pardon power beyond the “extent that the people . . . 
constitutionally granted it” to him.258  In particular,  
 
The people did not give the governor the power to pardon individuals 
convicted of treason or impeachment.  The people did not give the 
governor the power, without the consent of the Senate, to remit 
forfeitures or to grant reprieves to those convicted of treason.  The 
people did not give the governor the power to pardon an individual 
before he or she has been convicted of a crime.  And the people did not 
give the governor the power to pardon a convicted felon until the felon 
applying for pardon “shall have published for thirty days . . . his petition 
for pardon, setting forth therein the reasons why such pardon should be 
granted.”259 
 
                                                                                                                                          
specific town, called out the state militia to enforce certain laws in the town.  A tavern owner 
challenged the validity of the militia’s search of his establishment, asserting that the governor lacked 
the power to call the militia to engage in the law keeping activities it had performed in the tavern 
owner’s town.  The Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that generally, “when the Governor 
calls out the militia, his decision whether the exigency is such as to authorize him to do so is solely 
for his determination and is not subject to judicial question or review.”  Id. at 391.  The court 
nonetheless noted that where such executive action “comes into collision with the private personal or 
private property rights of any person within the jurisdiction of the state, such personal and property 
rights of the citizen and their infringements are always subject to inquiry and redress by the courts.”  
Id. at 391–92. 
256 In re Hooker 87 So. 3d at 419 (Waller, C.J., dissenting); id. at 440 (Pierce, J., dissenting). 
257 Id. at 426–27 n.85 (Waller, C.J., dissenting) (pardon is an example of the people’s mercy 
through the governor’s acts); id. at 440 (Pierce, J., dissenting) (pardon power is an act of “mercy and 
grace” by the people who vest pardoning power in their government). 
258 Id. at 426 (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
259 Id. at 419–20 (Waller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original citations omitted) (citing 
MISS. CONST. art V, § 124).  
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Stemming from the dissenting justices’ view that the pardon power was 
entirely vested in the people and merely entrusted to the executive branch, it 
followed that the state constitution’s notice provision existed to ensure that the 
governor appropriately extended the people’s grace and mercy.  Hence, the 
dissenting justices suggested that the publication requirement existed to ensure that 
the process by which a governor decided to pardon an individual was fair. 
The dissents also proffered that the publication requirement embodied the 
people’s right to petition the government260 and was included in the constitution to 
serve as a check on the executive branch to ensure transparency in its pardon 
decisions.261  Originally, the state constitution did not contain a pardon publication 
requirement, thereby leaving far more unfettered power in the executive branch to 
grant pardons.262  However, 1890 amendments to the state constitution included the 
pardon publication provision.263  The In re Hooker dissenting justices postulated 
that the reason for this change arose from a “widespread belief . . . that the 
[previous] constitution gave too much power to the governor.  It was charged that 
his patronage and pardoning powers were too broad,”264 could sometimes be 
improperly used, and therefore needed to be limited.265  The publication 
requirement thus existed to ensure that the people could provide information to the 
governor to operate as a check on the exercise of his otherwise substantive 
discretion in granting pardons, “making the exercise thereof transparent to the 
public.”266  As noted by one dissenting justice, 
 
Absent publication—which provides public notice that a convicted felon 
is seeking a pardon—the general public is silently and blindly cordoned 
off from the mansion and office of the governor, left unaware that its 
right to petition the government slowly disappears, before completely 
vanishing once pen touches paper.267 
 
Therefore, for the dissenting justices, the pardon power was an embodiment 
of the people’s acknowledgment that sometimes mercy was warranted within the 
broad arc of criminal justice.  However, the exercise of that mercy was possible 
only by virtue of the people granting such powers to the executive branch through 
the state constitution.  The constitution’s publication requirement served as a 
                                                                                                                                          
260 Id. at 421 (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
261 Id. at 422, 426–27 n.85; id. at 442 (Pierce, J., dissenting). 
262 Id. at 441–42 (Pierce, J., dissenting). 
263 Id.at 442. 
264 Attorney General Jim Hood’s Brief on Interlocutory Appeal at 17, In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 
401 (Miss. 2012) (No. 2012-IA-00166-SCT). 
265 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 442 (Pierce, J., dissenting). 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 421 (Randolph, J., dissenting); see also id. at 426–27 n.85. 
2015] MEASURED MERCY 133 
means to check any potential executive overreaching.  Again, the dissenting 
justices were suggesting that by ensuring that the governor heard from the citizenry 
prior to reaching a pardon decision, there was a greater guarantee that the final 
outcome would be viewed as legitimate. 
A majority of the In re Hooker court disagreed with this line of argument.268 
According to the majority, the publication requirement, just like the pardon power 
itself, was something that belonged entirely to the governor, and served merely as 
an internal process to be followed by the governor.  The In re Hooker majority 
strongly indicated that when a challenge was raised against the processes and 
procedures belonging to another branch of government, the judiciary should be 
very careful about second-guessing the internal processes of its co-equal branches 
of government.269  The majority also disagreed with the dissenters’ assertion that 
                                                                                                                                          
268 The majority did not necessarily undercut the dissent’s assertion that the pardoning power 
was something originally vested in the people that was subsequently entrusted to the governor, and in 
fact, discussed state precedent which supported such a proposition.  For example, the majority cited 
to and relied upon Montgomery v. Cleveland, 98 So. 111 (Miss. 1923) for the position that governor 
had the sole authority to determine whether the state constitution’s publication requirements were 
satisfied.  Montgomery guided in part that the governor “is the sole judge of the sufficiency of the 
facts and of the propriety of granting the pardon, and no other department of the government has any 
control over his acts or discretion in such matters.”  Id. at 114.  However, the language relied upon by 
the majority in In re Hooker from the Montgomery opinion was enveloped within a larger discussion 
which resonated far more with the dissenting justices’ view of the pardon power. 
While a pardon is a matter of grace, it is nevertheless the grace of the state, and not the 
personal favor of the Governor. It is granted out of consideration of public policy, for the 
benefit of the public as well as of the individual, and is to be exercised as the act of the 
sovereign state, not of the individual caprice of the occupant of the executive office as an 
individual. He is supposed to act in accordance with sound principles and upon proper 
facts presented to him. Of course, he is the sole judge of the sufficiency of the facts and of 
the propriety of granting the pardon, and no other department of the government has any 
control over his acts or discretion in such matters. Nevertheless he acts for the public. He 
dispenses the public mercy and grace; the efficacy of the pardon flows from the 
sovereign. The sovereign acts through the Governor, but it is none the less the act of the 
sovereign, and not the personal act of the Governor. . . . When a proper application is 
presented to the Governor, he is under duty to consider it; he has power to consider it; 
and while no authority other than his judgment and conscience can determine whether it 
is proper to grant or refuse the pardon, still his duty is to act upon the matter, to bring his 
mind and conscience to bear upon it, and to reach a determination in reference thereto. 
After so doing, if the application is meritorious, he grants the pardon; if it is otherwise, he 
refuses it.  
Id. at 114 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, the majority appeared to focus upon the Montgomery 
court’s articulation that the pardon power rests within the province of the executive branch in order to 
bolster the majority’s position that the power to pardon was something entirely vested with the 
governor and could be exercised at his absolute discretion.  See also Pope v. Wiggins, 69 So. 2d 913, 
915 (Miss. 1954) (“Under Section 124 of the Constitution of 1890, the power to grant pardons and to 
otherwise extend clemency, after the judicial process, whereby one has been convicted of a crime has 
come to an end, is vested in the governor alone.”). 
269 In evaluating the pardon publication requirement, the majority engaged in a detailed 
exegesis of the opinion Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512 (Miss. 1886).  In Wren, an out-of-state travelling 
salesman challenged whether he could be subject to a sales tax under a specific law, alleging that the 
law was invalid based on the faulty processes by which the law was passed.  Id. at 512–13.  The 
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the publication requirement somehow established in Mississippi citizens the right 
to petition their government, or some other form of a procedural due process 
right.270  To the extent the publication requirement created a right in anyone, the 
majority determined the right was “of the governor to receive complete 
information before granting a pardon.”271  In a concurring opinion, Presiding 
Justice Chandler roundly rejected any suggestion that the publication requirement 
embodied the people’s right to petition the government.  He interpreted Section 
124 of the Mississippi Constitution as having the purpose to “gather information 
for the governor, who all agree is vested with the sole discretion to decide whether 
to pardon a certain individual.”272  He went on to emphasize that even if the 
publication requirement did represent a reservation by the people of notice of a 
pardon, “the notion of such a right dissolves when considered in light of the fact 
that noticing the public has absolutely no impact on the governor’s decision to 
pardon.  All agree that the governor is fully empowered to ignore all protests and 
grant a pardon in his unfettered discretion.”273  Therefore, to the extent a right 
might exist, it promised very little.274   
Here, the justice missed a prime opportunity to infuse procedural justice 
principles into an otherwise discretionary process.  Of course, within most pardon 
systems, the final decision is left to the sole discretion of a single actor.  Hence, in 
stating that the “public has absolutely no impact on the governor’s decision to 
pardon,”275 the justice seemed to be asking, “What’s the point in asking for 
feedback?  The governor can do whatever he wants.”  But in asking “what’s the 
                                                                                                                                          
Mississippi Supreme Court declined to honor the salesman’s request, asserting that under a separation 
of powers theory, it had the power to review whether the law’s content violated the state constitution, 
but that such a duty begins only with a completed act of the legislative branch.  The court would not 
look behind the final passed version of the law to evaluate the internal machinations of the legislature 
and how it went about passing the law.  Id. at 533–34.  In discussing the Wren decision, the In re 
Hooker majority strongly indicated that when a challenge was raised against the processes and 
procedures belonging to another branch of government, whether that process was a pardon 
publication requirement, or whether the bill signed by the governor was exactly that which had 
passed both the state house and senate, the judiciary should be very careful about second guessing the 
internal process of its co-equal branches of government.  83 So. 3d at 406–12. 
270 In re Hooker, 83 So 3d at 411–12; id. at 417–18 (Chandler, J., concurring). 
271 Id. at 411 (majority opinion).  See also id. at 418 (Chandler, J., concurring) (discussing 
historical record accompanying the passage of § 124 to Mississippi Constitution and asserting that 
record supports proposition that publication requirement was for the governor’s benefit). 
272 Id. at 417. 
273 Id. at 418. 
274 Justice Chandler’s reasoning echoes that of the U.S. Supreme Court in District Attorney’s 
Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009).  In Osborne, the Court rejected 
a prisoner’s challenge regarding pardon, noting the entirely discretionary and gift-giving nature of the 
practice.  Id. at 67–68 (“We have held that noncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in 
traditional state executive clemency, to which no particular claimant is entitled as a matter of state 
law.”). 
275 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d at 418–19 (Chandler, J., concurring). 
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point,” the justice missed the point.  If within a decision making process, the 
decision maker is viewed to have listened and treated with respect all relevant 
voices to the discussion, the final decision, even if to the displeasure of some, will 
be more likely accepted, deemed legitimate, and honored. 
Finally, the Mississippi court suggested that even if the publication provision 
did create some sort of right of notice and hearing on the public, the right only 
conferred benefits to “the public in general, and not to any particular private 
person.”276  Without directly referring to the justiciable issue of standing, the court 
ruled that without a particular individual before it asserting the violation of an 
individual right, there were no grounds to hear the matter before it.  The court went 
on to note, 
 
We are mindful that the victims and their families are entitled to be 
interested in the subject matter of this case, and they are undoubtedly—
and understandably—concerned with its outcome.  But no party stands 
before this court claiming a violation of his or her personal or private 
property rights.  The attorney general brings this claim on behalf of the 
state of Mississippi, and no particular individual.277 
 
Nowhere else in the court’s opinion did it acknowledge or reference how its 
decision might impact those who were the victims of the pardoned individual’s 
crimes, except to obliquely suggest that victim voices might muddy their decision-
making process.278  Moreover, even the dissenting justices spoke of the publication 
requirement as a right that belonged to the people of the state of Mississippi, 
without specific reference to the victims who had suffered at the hands of the 
pardoned parties.279   
It was only after the Mississippi Supreme Court issued its opinion that the 
state Attorney General, in a motion for reconsideration, explicitly contended that 
by virtue of the state’s victims’ rights laws, specific individuals, i.e., the victims of 
the pardoned parties’ crimes, had personal rights that were violated by the 
governor’s failure to comply with the state constitution publication provisions.280  
Relying on the state constitution’s Victims’ Rights Amendment,281 and 
                                                                                                                                          
276 Id. at 411 (majority opinion). 
277 Id. 
278 In a concurring opinion, one of the justices stated that it was important to “calmly and 
unemotionally consider” the issues before it.  Id. at 416–17 (Carlson, P.J., concurring). 
279 Id. at 421, 426 (Randolph, J., dissenting); id. at 441 (Pierce, J. dissenting). 
280 Attorney General Jim Hood’s Motion for Reconsideration at 1–2, In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 
401 (Miss. 2012) (No. 2012-IA-00166-SCT). 
281 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A(1) (“Victims of crime, as defined by law, shall have the right to 
be treated with fairness, dignity and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and to be 
informed, to be present and to be heard, when authorized by law, during public hearings.”).  
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accompanying legislation,282 the Attorney General claimed that by failing to 
comply with the pardon publication provision, the Governor had violated victims’ 
rights to have notice and be heard when parole or pardon was considered for a 
defendant.  According to the Attorney General, state law vested within the victims 
of the pardoned individuals the right to have notice and to be heard in regard to the 
governor’s decision to pardon the convicts.  In supporting this argument, he 
pointed to one portion of the state’s crime victim legislation commanding that “the 
victim shall have the right to be notified and allowed to submit a written or 
recorded statement when parole or pardon is considered.”283  Because the pardons 
were not properly published and the victims were denied the opportunity to 
provide information to the governor regarding his pending pardon decisions, the 
victims’ personal rights to notice and a hearing were violated, and thus the court 
had jurisdiction to hear the case.  The Attorney General further asserted that the 
pardon publication requirement detailed in Section 124 of the state constitution and 
the notice and hearing requirements listed in the state’s victims’ rights laws 
mirrored one another.  Therefore, “the notice required under Section 124 of the 
Constitution falls within the ambit of the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights” and 
associated state legislation.284 
Finally, the Attorney General argued that the pardon process was an inherent 
part of the criminal justice system and therefore warranted judicial review.  So 
doing, the Attorney General appeared to be signaling that pardons, and the 
information victims might be able to provide to the decision maker, existed to 
serve justice and ensure that government sanctions, or reprieve thereof, was fair.  
Because the state’s victims’ rights legislation included a provision regarding a 
victim’s right to notice and to be heard in respect to a convict’s pardon or parole, 
the Attorney General argued that the Mississippi Legislature had signaled that the 
pardon process should fall within the ambit of judicial review.  Regardless of the 
state attorney’s arguments, the state supreme court rejected the motion for 
reconsideration.285 
The court’s rejection is not entirely surprising.  The type of property interests 
normally honored by courts tend to be more tangible in nature.286  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court has been equally clear that processes, like the right to receive 
notice or be heard by a court, cannot in and of themselves be deemed substantive 
rights.287  However, the judicial reluctance to recognize and provide enforceable 
substance to statutorily and constitutionally created victims’ rights adds to victim 
                                                                                                                                          
282 See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-43-1 to -49 (2014). 
283 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-43(2) (2014) (emphasis added). 
284 Attorney General Jim Hood’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4, In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401 
(Miss. 2012) (No. 2012-IA-00166-SCT). 
285 See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, rehearing denied, No. 2012-IA-00166 (May 17, 2012). 
286 See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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rights advocates’ ongoing frustration in trying to gain a solid foothold in criminal 
procedure. 
The In re Hooker opinion provides a textbook example of the challenges 
surrounding the fluid history and nature of pardon practice and how that ever-
shifting practice does not create an immediately hospitable place for crime victims.  
The predominately discretionary nature of the practice tends to prompt the 
judiciary to take a “hands-off” approach to reviewing pardon decisions, whether 
for victims or offenders.  However, in following suit, the In re Hooker court 
missed out on the opportunity to emphasize how procedural justice principles 
could enhance and legitimize pardon practice. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is no easy way to fit crime victims into existing pardon practice.  
Because the theory and practice of pardon shuttles between the concepts of justice 
and mercy, it is difficult for victims to establish a foothold in a landscape that is 
inconsistent.  To the extent that pardons exist to serve justice, the focus tends to be 
on whether the defendant was fairly punished, rather than whether the defendant’s 
sentence fairly considers the victim’s harm.  Conversely, to the extent that pardons 
exist as a manifestation of grace, that mercy tends to be directed to alleviate 
defendant rather than victim suffering.  Hence, victims are regularly shut out of 
either construct.  However, procedural justice principles can go a great distance to 
create space in the intersection where victim interests and executive pardons meet 
and find the appropriate balance between justice and grace.  By ensuring that all 
parties in a pardon decision are treated fairly and that the processes used to read 
the pardon decision are fair and even-handed, the state and federal criminal justice 
systems can promote a pardon practice that extends measured mercy to all 
involved. 

